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Abstract 
 
People are constantly making sense of their environment, explaining a wide variety of events and 
facts that they encounter. Often, these explanations are the product of a heuristic process that 
relies on highly accessible information to make sense of a phenomenon (Cimpian & Salomon, 
2014a, 2014b; Thomas, Dougherty, Sprenger, & Harbison, 2008). Importantly, highly accessible 
information is often skewed to include features inherent to that which is being reasoned about, 
without reference to external impact or happenstance. Because of this bias in highly accessible 
information, generating explanations heuristically has downstream consequences for the beliefs 
people hold about the way the world works. Here, I focus on two beliefs that I propose are 
underlain by inherent reasoning. In Part 1, six studies provide evidence that children’s and 
adults’ inherent reasoning promotes a belief that words and their referents are not arbitrarily 
paired but rather “fit” particularly well together (nominal fit). In Part 2, I provide evidence across 
three studies that inherent reasoning may also play a role in the development of essentialist 
beliefs. Overall, this work suggests that general inherent reasoning buttresses disparate beliefs 
about the way the world works. These findings highlight the value in investigating the ways in 
which abstract, higher-order judgments and beliefs are shaped by basic cognitive processes. 
 
 
 
iii 
Acknowledgements 
The support that has brought me to this point has been so impactful, humbling and 
continuously astounding. This note does not do everyone justice, and cannot adequately express 
the extent of my gratefulness, but here is what I can say: 
Andrei has gone way beyond advising my doctoral research. I can confidently say (and do 
confidently say) that he has helped me to reach my potential as a researcher at this point, laying 
a solid foundation to develop my writing and critical thinking. Other faculty have also been 
incredible mentors and have provided valuable support. Renee has been an active mentor for 
every milestone throughout the program and has consistently encouraged me, most notably 
during my setting up next steps. Such encouragement has also been explicit in working with 
Susan—from my first project, to talking about ideas, and discussing the future. Ori sparked my 
interest in research and remains an inspiring mentor. Cindy, Aaron, and John each helped to 
develop my scientific inquiry through their feedback on my projects as well as in their classes. 
Beyond faculty support, I am so grateful to have had fellow graduate students who are 
both great people as well as scientists (Lin, Christina, Larisa, Michelle, Zach, Daniel, Erika, Xin, 
Ethan, Mike(s), Miatta, Noam, and Liz). They have all made such a difference to me in my time in 
grad school. My work was made possible in large part because of many research assistants, lab 
managers, schools, parents, children, and departmental staff; it was fantastic working with them.  
And the financial support from the NSERC and APF helped me to focus on my projects. 
So many others have provided priceless emotional and personal support. My parents 
(Jeff and Kim), brother (MacKenzie), and grandparents (Skip and Nancy; as well as Muriel, Lloy, 
and Cyrus) have always stood close, encouraging, cheering, and guiding me. They mean the 
iv 
world to me. And I was always comforted in knowing that the rest of my family also had my back 
in any circumstance.  
Anyone who knows me well right now will know the names Christina, Larisa, and 
Michelle. These unbelievable ladies, soul-mates, have held my hand and walked with me day in 
and day out throughout the past four years. They are incredibly generous, supportive, fun, sassy, 
thoughtful, scientific, true-friends. I could not have gotten through grad school without them.  
I was also lucky enough to have more invaluable support and friendship from fantastic 
humans that I look up to and will work hard to remain close with. First, Marie has not stopped 
being there for me, near and far, since we first became friends in high school. I am so excited 
that my next step is going to bring us nearer than ever. Second, Caroline’s and Kye’s genuineness 
and consideration makes for a deeply rooted friendship. It allows for a thought provoking, loving, 
and incredibly comfortable space that I am so grateful to have had during this time. There are 
two other people who have made the most palpable (positive) effect on my perception and 
reasoning that I know will maintain its impact through the next many chapters of my life: Ellen 
takes caring and thoughtfulness to a new level. I love thinking with her, and the perspective that 
she continues to show me. Luke has helped me get to a distinctly healthier way of thinking and 
seeing things. The difference is so obvious and unbelievable. I don’t have the words to describe 
how grateful I am for that. Lastly, in this non-exhaustive list, I want to thank the many other 
friends in psych, at NCF, back home, and (now) scattered around the world, for letting me lean 
on you in moments throughout my time at Illinois.  
I have learned so much academically and personally in these past five years and wouldn’t 
be who I am and where I am now without all of these people. 
v 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 
The complexity underlying the process of explanation .................................................................. 2 
Explanations tend to rely on highly accessible information ........................................................... 3 
Accessible information is often inherent to the explanandum ...................................................... 3 
Evidence for the inherence heuristic ............................................................................................... 5 
Consequences of the inherence heuristic ....................................................................................... 6 
Chapter 2: Part 1. Inherent Reasoning Gives Rise to the Belief that Words Are Well Suited for 
Their Referents ...................................................................................................................................... 8 
Prior Evidence on Beliefs about Nominal Fit ................................................................................... 9 
Nominal Fit Intuitions Are a Product of the Heuristic Processes Underlying Explanation .......... 11 
The Current Studies......................................................................................................................... 13 
Chapter 3: Study 1 ............................................................................................................................... 15 
Methods ........................................................................................................................................... 15 
Participants. ................................................................................................................................. 15 
Procedure. ................................................................................................................................... 15 
Measures. .................................................................................................................................... 15 
Data analyses. .............................................................................................................................. 19 
Results and Discussion .................................................................................................................... 20 
Chapter 4: Study 2 ............................................................................................................................... 22 
Methods ........................................................................................................................................... 23 
Participants. ................................................................................................................................. 23 
Measures. .................................................................................................................................... 23 
Results and Discussion .................................................................................................................... 25 
Chapter 5: Study 3 ............................................................................................................................... 26 
Methods ........................................................................................................................................... 26 
Participants. ................................................................................................................................. 26 
Measures. .................................................................................................................................... 26 
Results and Discussion .................................................................................................................... 27 
Chapter 6: Study 4 ............................................................................................................................... 29 
Methods ........................................................................................................................................... 29 
Participants. ................................................................................................................................. 29 
Measures. .................................................................................................................................... 29 
Results and Discussion .................................................................................................................... 30 
Chapter 7: Study 5 ............................................................................................................................... 31 
Methods ........................................................................................................................................... 32 
Participants. ................................................................................................................................. 32 
Measures. .................................................................................................................................... 32 
Results and Discussion .................................................................................................................... 34 
vi 
Chapter 8: Study 6 ............................................................................................................................... 36 
Methods ........................................................................................................................................... 36 
Participants. ................................................................................................................................. 36 
Procedure and Materials. ............................................................................................................ 36 
Results and Discussion .................................................................................................................... 38 
Chapter 9: Discussion of Part 1 .......................................................................................................... 40 
Theoretical Contributions ............................................................................................................... 40 
Why Do Beliefs about Nominal Fit Persist into Adulthood? ......................................................... 41 
Nominal Fit Intuitions: Shallow or Sophisticated? ......................................................................... 42 
Future Directions ............................................................................................................................. 43 
Chapter 10: Part 2. Inherent Reasoning Provides Important Foundations for Children’s 
Essentialist Beliefs ............................................................................................................................... 45 
Various uses of the term “essentialism” ........................................................................................ 46 
Possible Sources of Essentialist Beliefs .......................................................................................... 49 
The current proposal: Inherent reasoning facilitates the development of essentialism. ....... 52 
Recent Findings in line with the Proposal ...................................................................................... 54 
Current Studies ................................................................................................................................ 56 
Chapter 11: Study 7 ............................................................................................................................ 57 
Methods ........................................................................................................................................... 57 
Participants. ................................................................................................................................. 57 
Procedure. ................................................................................................................................... 57 
Results and Discussion .................................................................................................................... 61 
Chapter 12: Study 8 ............................................................................................................................ 63 
Methods ........................................................................................................................................... 63 
Participants. ................................................................................................................................. 63 
Procedure. ................................................................................................................................... 63 
Data Analysis. ............................................................................................................................... 65 
Results and Discussion .................................................................................................................... 65 
Chapter 13: Study 9 ............................................................................................................................ 69 
Methods ........................................................................................................................................... 69 
Participants. ................................................................................................................................. 69 
Procedure. ................................................................................................................................... 69 
Results and Discussion .................................................................................................................... 69 
Chapter 14: Discussion of Part 2 ........................................................................................................ 71 
Chapter 15: Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 76 
References ........................................................................................................................................... 78 
Tables ................................................................................................................................................... 94 
Table 1.............................................................................................................................................. 94 
Table 2.............................................................................................................................................. 95 
vii 
Table 3.............................................................................................................................................. 96 
Table 4.............................................................................................................................................. 97 
Table 5.............................................................................................................................................. 98 
Table 6.............................................................................................................................................. 99 
Table 7............................................................................................................................................ 100 
Table 8............................................................................................................................................ 101 
Table 9............................................................................................................................................ 102 
Appendix A.........................................................................................................................................103 
Appendix B .........................................................................................................................................104 
Appendix C .........................................................................................................................................105 
Appendix D ........................................................................................................................................106 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Beginning in infancy (e.g., Aguiar & Baillargeon, 2002; Saxe, Tenenbaum, & Carey, 2005), 
and across development, people constantly need to make sense of their environment, explaining 
events that they encounter. Not only are people explaining on a routine basis, but they also 
explain a wide variety of phenomena (e.g., why was there a bang in the hall? why is there always 
a line at that store? why does it feel so relaxing to be by water?). When making sense of an 
experience or phenomenon, there are often countless factors, at least in principle, to consider in 
order to put together an accurate and complete judgment. At the same time, people have 
limited time and cognitive resources to devote to generating explanations. Because of these 
seemingly opposing forces, people might often engage in a simpler process, generating 
explanations that are “good enough” using relevant information that is most easily accessible in 
memory (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014a). Here, I outline prior work on a heuristic explanatory 
process, and propose that a skew in the content of the information that tends to be used in this 
process gives rise to many common beliefs about the way the world works. Specifically, in Part 1 
I will focus on people’s intuitive beliefs about how language works. In Part 2, I investigate 
children’s intuitive beliefs about categories—in particular, the assumption that many categories 
in the world have deep underlying “essences.” Before moving on to these particular proposals, I 
will first discuss the explanatory process that may underlie the development of these beliefs.  
Accumulating evidence suggests that people typically generate explanations heuristically 
(Cimpian & Salomon, 2014a, 2014b; Salomon & Cimpian, 2014; see also Thomas, Dougherty, & 
Buttaccio, 2014). That is, the process of generating everyday explanations (1) does not always 
require extensive cognitive resources, (2) often relies on highly accessible information, and (3) 
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does not use an exceptionally high standard for evaluating the quality of the explanation 
generated.1 Explaining in this way is likely quite frequent: People are able to make sense of new, 
even unexpected, situations constantly throughout the day, without focused deliberation at 
every turn. Furthermore, even preschoolers generate explanations frequently and with relative 
ease despite the, at least in-principle, complexity in the cognitive processes involved in 
generating explanations (e.g., Hickling & Wellman, 2001). Thus, it seems plausible to claim that 
our cognitive systems take shortcuts when generating explanations—that is, that people 
generate explanations heuristically. The idea of explanation as a heuristic process is key for the 
current purposes of investigating the beliefs that may follow, as the properties of this heuristic 
process might give rise to many common assumptions about how the world works. Next, I 
discuss the argument for explanations being heuristic.  
The complexity underlying the process of explanation 
In theory, generating an explanation for a particular event or phenomenon is an 
incredibly complex task. Even a simple explanandum such as eggs being a common breakfast 
food has countless factors that could be considered when coming up with an explanation. An 
adequate explanation for this phenomenon would probably require a great deal of in depth 
information. At the same time, people make sense of their surroundings in the moment.  Even 
very young children quickly and easily generate explanations for their observations (e.g., Hickling 
& Wellman, 2001). The contrast between the number of factors that could be considered in 
generating an explanation, and the ease with which people explain, can be reconciled if the act 
                                                     
1
 The term “heuristic” is used in two fairly distinct ways in the literature on reasoning: One refers to a more 
conscious implementation of a rule of thumb, to deliberately simplify a task, and another to an implicit process that 
uses intuitive reasoning, little cognitive resources, and is highly dependent on easily available information (e.g., 
Chaiken & Ledgerwood, 2012; Evans, 2008). Here, I will be using the latter sense of the term. 
3 
 
of explaining was at least at times underlain by a heuristic process.2 
Explanations tend to rely on highly accessible information  
If explanations are often a product of a heuristic process they will also often over-rely on 
highly accessible information. This tendency is found with other heuristic judgments (e.g., 
Chaiken & Ledgerwood, 2012; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Thomas et al., 2014; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). For instance, when asked to judge the frequency of words that begin with the 
letter “k” compared to words that have the letter in the third position, people will often 
incorrectly choose the former as more frequent due to the higher accessibility of words that 
start with “k” in memory (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Such an over-reliance on highly 
accessible information is considerably less prevalent with more analytic, effortful thinking (Evans 
& Stanovich, 2013). In the context of generating explanations, what impact might such an over-
reliance on highly accessible information have on the content of the explanations people form? 
Accessible information is often inherent to the explanandum 
Both direct and indirect evidence suggests that highly accessible information is often 
about inherent features of the entities whose behaviors or properties are being explained 
(Hussak & Cimpian, under review; see also Ashcraft, 1978; McRae, de Sa, & Seidenberg, 1997; 
Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Wong & Weiner, 1981).3 That is, it is often easier to retrieve facts about 
                                                     
2
 To be clear, I am not claiming that heuristic reasoning is the only way through which people explain. First, there are 
likely specific theories that people have about particular phenomena that they can use to direct their explanatory 
processes, without relying on finding the relevant factors among a wide array of possibilities (e.g., objects fall when 
unsupported; e.g., Hespos & Baillargeon, 2008; Needham & Baillargeon, 1993). And second, people sometimes 
recall previously learned explanations rather than generating an explanation anew. For instance, when explaining to 
a child why the light went out, people can use their knowledge about how lights works to arrive at two possibilities: 
either the bulb burnt out or the power is off. However, I am arguing that in many cases people use heuristic 
reasoning processes in generating their explanations (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014a; Thomas, Dougherty, Sprenger, & 
Harbison, 2008; Salomon & Cimpian, 2014). 
3
 The use of the term “inherent” refers to a psychological notion—the way most people would judge whether a 
feature is inherent—not to whether features are truly inherent in a metaphysical sense. 
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the explanandum itself, which do not reference external entities, than it is other facts. For 
instance, an inherent explanation for why we eat eggs more in the morning (than other times of 
the day) might be that eggs have a lot of protein (an inherent feature). In the same way, when 
explaining why girls paint their nails and why cats have been domesticated, it is likely that 
features inherent to girls and cats will come to mind quickly and easily.4 Such inherent facts tend 
to come to mind faster and more often than non-inherent facts (Hussak & Cimpian, 2015): 
people are more likely to generate inherent explanations when they are under time pressure 
than when they are able to take more time (Hussak & Cimpian, under review).  
In line with these findings, Cimpian and Salomon (2014a, 2014b) proposed that people 
typically generate explanations through a heuristic explanatory process that typically outputs 
inherence-based explanations—a process that they termed the inherence heuristic. According to 
the inherence heuristic proposal, the process of explaining begins when the need for an 
explanation is detected. Accessible (thus often inherent) information might then come to mind 
right away, and people will tend to use this information to put together an explanation. This 
explanation is then checked against a fairly low standard of plausibility (see Cimpian and 
Salomon, 2014a, 2014b, and Cimpian, 2015, for a comprehensive description of the process). 
The process is not engaged for every explanation people generate. It is instead one process that 
is frequently used, and that often results in a skew towards inherent explanations.  
                                                     
4
 In work testing for an inherence bias, it is important for the researcher to keep clear the explanandum of the 
particular explanation—just knowing the explanation alone is not enough to determine whether it is inherent .  The 
importance of taking into account the explanandum can be seen in the following example. An inherent explanation 
for why there are so many female nurses would be “because women really enjoy doing that.” However, the same 
explanation (“because women really enjoy doing that”) would not be considered inherent if it was given as an 
answer to why there are so many nail salons—women’s preference is a factor that’s extrinsic to the explanandum in 
this case (i.e., nail salons and their abundance). 
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Evidence for the inherence heuristic 
If inherent explanations are often the product of an intuitive, low-effort heuristic process, 
then such explanations should be more common when fewer cognitive resources are available to 
explain (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Trope & Gaunt, 2000). Consistent 
with this prediction, when adults were experimentally induced to use few cognitive resources, 
they showed a stronger preference for inherence-based explanations (Hussak & Cimpian, 2015; 
Salomon & Cimpian, in preparation). Similarly, adults with a general cognitive tendency to avoid 
deep contemplative reasoning are also more likely to reason inherently (Hussak & Cimpian, 
2015; Salomon & Cimpian, 2014; Sutherland & Cimpian, 2015; Tworek & Cimpian, in press). If an 
inherence bias in explanation is due to a heuristic process, the bias should be more prevalent in 
children. Children have fewer cognitive resources in general than adults, and thus they should be 
more likely to rely on an available heuristic process (Kokis et al., 2002; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 
2014). Initial tests of children’s explanations suggest this prediction likely holds: when children 
were provided with both inherent and extrinsic explanations, they showed a consistent 
preference for the inherent ones (Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014). Ongoing work testing the 
explanations that children generate themselves is also consistent with this prediction 
(Sutherland & Cimpian, in progress). Moreover, children showed a stronger preference for 
inherent explanations than adults did. Evidence of a heightened inherence bias in children, who 
also tend to have fewer cognitive resources, supports the heuristic nature of the explanatory 
process.  
Before moving on to discuss how the process of heuristic explanation might influence 
people’s beliefs about the way the world works, there are three important points to keep in 
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mind about the inherence bias. First, the inherence bias in explanation is a product of the 
information that comes to mind quickly and easily. Therefore, while on average inherent 
information about the entity at hand will be over-represented in the most accessible 
information, in cases where non-inherent information is most accessible to the reasoner, the 
bias would not be expected to be present. For instance, someone’s cherished object (e.g., a lucky 
pen) will likely have accessible its history and specific external associations, especially compared 
to reasoning about an object that is merely a representative of its category (e.g., just any pen; 
Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 2012; Gelman, Manczak, Was, & Noles, 2016; Nancekivell & 
Friedman, 2013). Additionally, an expert on a particular topic will likely have a lot of other 
information readily available, much of which might be non-inherent (Tworek & Cimpian, in prep). 
Second, inherent explanations are not hypothesized to be a result of the reasoner searching for 
inherent facts intentionally, but simply a byproduct of the fact that inherent information comes 
to mind quickly and easily, along with the ease of putting together an explanation with this 
accessible information. Third, because the expected inherence bias is a product of the 
information that tends to be accessible, explainers do not need to be able to identify inherent 
facts on their own. 
Consequences of the inherence heuristic 
While a heuristic explanatory process is largely beneficial for people in making sense of 
their surroundings without having to devoting a large amount of cognitive resources to the task, 
as is the case with most heuristics, there are also unintended consequences for such reasoning. 
If people tend to generate explanations heuristically, and these explanations tend to rely on 
inherent facts, this skew will be mirrored in people’s beliefs about their surroundings. What 
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might these beliefs look like? Inherent features tend to be stable features of an entity (e.g., 
Vitamin C is an inherent feature of oranges, and it is also a stable feature of oranges). Inherent 
features are also often believed to be non-arbitrary (or one that couldn’t have easily been 
otherwise). Thus, beliefs about different aspects of the world being stable and non-arbitrary 
might have their roots in the tendency to reason inherently. In this dissertation proposal, I focus 
on two beliefs from different domains that rely strongly the ideas of stability and non-
arbitrariness: the belief that words and the objects they refer to are not contingent (Part 1), and 
the belief that natural and social category members all hold category-specific internal essences 
(Part 2). I provide initial evidence that both may be partly rooted in inherent reasoning.  
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Chapter 2: Part 1. Inherent Reasoning Gives Rise to the Belief that  
Words Are Well Suited for Their Referents5 
The words of a language are arbitrary social conventions. In English, for example, we call 
trees trees and cows cows, but we could have just as well called trees cows and vice-versa. There 
is no inherent reason why particular words refer to particular objects, in English or any other 
language.6 However, that may not be exactly how people see this matter. In the present 
research, I build on prior evidence by Piaget (1967) to suggest that children—and even adults—
systematically endorse a belief that words “fit” the objects they denote rather than being 
arbitrarily paired with them. Further, I test a potential source of these wide-ranging intuitions 
about word–object fit (or, as I will refer to it, nominal fit7), suggesting that they are a product of 
the heuristic processes through which people explain the world. More generally, this work seeks 
to provide new insights into how people conceive of language and to reveal the deep links 
between these conceptions and the cognitive processes involved in explanation and 
understanding. In the first section below, I briefly review previous evidence regarding beliefs 
about nominal fit. I then detail my proposal concerning how these beliefs arise and describe six 
studies that investigated this proposal. 
                                                     
5
 Part 1 has been published in Sutherland, S. L. & Cimpian, A. (2015). An explanatory heuristic gives rise to the beliefs 
that words are well suited for their referents. Cognition, 143, 228-240. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2015.07.002 
Copyright permission to include this work in the dissertation has been granted.  
6
 Phonetic symbolism, the phenomenon whereby certain sounds have non-arbitrary links to certain meanings (e.g., 
Maurer, Pathman, & Mondloch, 2006), is more of an exception than a general rule for how the vocabulary of a 
language maps onto its referents.  
7
 This term is a play on Piaget’s (1967) nominal realism. The latter is broadly used to refer to a number of beliefs 
about a non-arbitrary link between words and objects (including, for example, a belief that names are features of 
the objects or that names have causal effects on the world [see Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986; Rozin, Markwith, 
& Ross, 1990]). For this reason, I introduced the term nominal fit to pick out specifically the phenomenon studied 
here—namely, a belief that words are particularly suitable for their referents. 
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Prior Evidence on Beliefs about Nominal Fit 
 According to Piaget (1967), beliefs about nominal fit represent an intermediate stage in 
children’s reasoning about words (see also Brook, 1970; Ianco-Worrall, 1972; Vygotsky, 1962).8 
Early in development, children assume a word to do more than just pick out an object; they also 
believe that the word matches its referent at some level. This belief that words have a special 
match with the features of their referents was suggested by children’s reasoning about why 
objects have the names they do (Piaget, 1967; see also Brook, 1970; Ianco-Worrall, 1972; 
Vygotsky, 1962). For instance, the children interviewed by Piaget thought that the sun is called 
sun not because of arbitrary conventions established in the past but “because it shines” or 
“because it is all red”; or, to take another example, the mountains are called mountains 
“because they are all white” (Piaget, 1967, p. 84). The underlying intuition here is that an object 
has the name it does because this name appropriately captures how this object is constituted—
names function almost like descriptions (see Russell, 1905). Because they assume nominal fit, 
children also fail to realize that the names of objects could have been different than they 
currently are. For example, children claimed that the sun couldn’t have been called moon and 
vice-versa because “the sun makes it warm and the moon gives light” or because “the sun shines 
brighter than the moon” (Piaget, 1967, p. 81). 
 Some of this evidence, however, was subsequently criticized on methodological grounds. 
For example, Markman (1976) pointed out that Piaget’s questions often presumed a 
sophisticated meta-level understanding of words as objective units of language. Reasoning about 
words as words may be difficult for young children (e.g., Osherson & Markman, 1975; 
                                                     
8
 Piaget labeled the idea that names fit their referents logical realism. Since the term logical realism is relatively 
opaque, I prefer to use nominal fit. 
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Papandropoulou & Sinclair, 1974), and thus children may have answered Piaget’s questions as if 
they were about the referents instead (see also Bialystok, 1987). When children claimed, for 
instance, that the sun couldn’t have been called moon, they might have been doing so because 
they were reasoning about the referent objects rather than about the names of these objects (as 
if they had been asked whether the sun is the same thing as the moon). Another prominent 
criticism concerns the fact that some of Piaget’s questions required counterfactual reasoning 
(e.g., “could we have called the sun moon?”), which might have been too taxing for children’s 
limited cognitive resources (e.g., Rosenblum & Pinker, 1983). Without appropriate scaffolding, 
young children might have failed to understand the hypothetical scenario, believing instead that 
they were being asked about the current names of the relevant objects (e.g., “do we call the sun 
moon?”).  
 While reasonable, these criticisms are not sufficient to undermine the claim that children 
see words as being suited for their referents. Note, for instance, that children give answers that 
suggest they believe in nominal fit well into the elementary school years (e.g., Ball & Simpson, 
1977; Brook, 1970; Piaget, 1967), by which point they have fairly mature metalinguistic 
awareness of words as elements of language (e.g., Doherty, 2000; Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, Sims, 
Jones, & Cuckle, 1996) and well-developed counterfactual reasoning skills (e.g., Beck, Robinson, 
Carroll, & Apperly, 2006; German & Nichols, 2003; Harris, German, & Mills, 1996).  
 Although existing evidence for intuitions about nominal fit cannot be fully explained by 
low-level alternatives, research on this topic has been largely dormant in the past few decades, 
preventing progress on understanding these intriguing beliefs. Most notably, we know very little 
about their source: Why would children believe so firmly, and for so long, in a fit between names 
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and objects, especially given that this fit is illusory? Here, I test the proposal that these beliefs 
are a product of the broader processes by which people make sense of the world across 
development. Aside from yielding new insights into a decades-old phenomenon that has not yet 
received a satisfactory account, this research contributes more broadly to our understanding of 
the ways people conceive of language. By demonstrating that people’s intuitive understanding of 
the relation between words and objects is continuous with their understanding of non-linguistic 
phenomena, these studies forge new links between the research on explanation and reasoning 
and the work on metalinguistic conceptions, perhaps spurring new interest in this often-
overlooked topic. 
Nominal Fit Intuitions Are a Product of the Heuristic Processes Underlying Explanation 
 The most common and effective route to understanding a phenomenon is to explain it 
(e.g., de Regt, 2013; Hempel, 1965; Keil, 2006; Lombrozo, 2012), and therefore people’s 
understanding of the relationship between words and their referents may likewise be rooted in 
the explanations they generate for these mappings. In other words, attending to the 
mechanisms that underlie everyday explanations might provide insight into people’s nominal fit 
intuitions. Indeed, there is already considerable evidence that people tend to generate 
explanations using heuristic processes that tend to over-rely on information inherent to that 
being explained. Furthermore, the presence of such an inherence heuristic in explanation is 
common across development (see previous section; e.g., Cimpian & Markman, 2009, 2011; 
Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014; Hussak & Cimpian, 2015; Salomon & Cimpian, 2014). But how might 
this inherence heuristic promote intuitions about nominal fit?  
To start, it is worth noting that a phenomenon explained inherently is thereby 
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understood as arising simply as a product of the entities that make it up, which is also likely to 
make this phenomenon appear natural and sensible rather than one that could have easily been 
otherwise (Cimpian, 2015; Cimpian & Salomon, 2014a, 2014b; Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014; 
Hussak & Cimpian, 2015; Tworek & Cimpian, 2015). For example, if one explains why stop signs 
are red using the fact that red is a bright color, then—in light of this explanation—the pairing of 
stop signs and red might also seem natural, even appropriate. This explanation suggests that red 
is a suitable color for stop signs, perhaps even the color that stop signs should be. In other 
words, explaining an observation in inherent terms often licenses further, value-laden judgments 
about it (for a similar argument concerning the link between explanation and normativity, see 
Prasada & Dillingham, 2006). This is the rationale for the current proposal of a link between the 
inherence heuristic and beliefs about nominal fit. I hypothesize that, when children attempt to 
understand why certain objects have the names they do, they often rely on the inherence 
heuristic and, as a result, they arrive at explanations couched in terms of the highly accessible 
inherent features of the referents (e.g., their appearance) or the names (e.g., their sound). In 
turn, these inherent explanations further suggest to children, and perhaps even to adults, that 
words are appropriately paired with their referents. If children make sense of why, say, trees are 
called trees by invoking some feature of these objects (e.g., because they have branches)—as if 
the name describes them—then this name might also seem fitting and sensible to children 
rather than an arbitrary convention that could have easily been otherwise. 
 Initial support for this proposal can be found in children’s unambiguously inherent 
explanations to Piaget’s (1967) questions about why objects have the names they do (see also 
Brook, 1970; Rosenblum & Pinker, 1983). For example, children said the sun is called sun 
13 
 
because of its brightness, its heat, or its color, and they also thought that it couldn’t have any 
other name. Also consistent with my argument, some evidence suggests that children’s failure to 
understand words as arbitrary conventions is strongly correlated with their failure to understand 
other regularities as conventions (e.g., rules of etiquette such as eating with utensils rather than 
with one’s hands; Lockhart, Abrahams, & Osherson, 1977).9 These tight relationships are exactly 
what would be expected if children’s explanations for a broad range of linguistic and non-
linguistic regularities relied on the same fundamental cognitive process (the inherence heuristic; 
Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014). 
The Current Studies 
 Building on this preliminary evidence, the six studies reported here in Part 1 provide the 
first direct test of the proposal that nominal fit beliefs are rooted in an inherence heuristic in 
explanation. These studies investigated three predictions of the proposal. First, the extent to 
which children rely on the inherence heuristic should predict the extent to which they endorse 
beliefs in nominal fit (Study 1). Second, because the inherence heuristic is influential beyond 
childhood (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014a, 2014b; Hussak & Cimpian, 2015; Salomon & Cimpian, 
2014), I expected to find evidence for the same relationship in adults’ reasoning as well, even 
though their intuitions about nominal fit should obviously be weaker than children’s and thus 
show less variability (Studies 2–5). Moreover, the relationship between endorsement of nominal 
fit beliefs and reliance on the inherence heuristic should hold even when adjusting for a number 
                                                     
9
 The present argument does not conflict with the developmental literature on children’s awareness of the 
conventionality of words (e.g., Buresh & Woodward, 2007; Clark, 1988; Diesendruck, 2005; Diesendruck & Markson, 
2011; Graham, Stock, & Henderson, 2006; see also Cimpian & Scott, 2012). In this literature, conventionality is 
operationalized as an understanding that a word is widely known— a different dimension of conventionality than 
the one I am investigating here. Conventionality is a multifaceted construct, and some facets of it (i.e., words are 
widely known) will likely be much easier to grasp than others (i.e., words are arbitrary). 
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of other individual differences that could provide alternative explanations for it (e.g., fluid 
intelligence, motivation for effortful thought, familiarity with foreign languages). Finally, an 
experimental manipulation that temporarily alters the extent to which adults rely on inherence-
based intuitions should have downstream effects on their nominal fit beliefs (Study 6). Across 
these six studies, I found consistent support for the proposal that an inherence heuristic in 
explanation gives rise to the intuition that words are well suited for their referents. 
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Chapter 3: Study 1 
 In the first study, I investigated whether children’s nominal fit beliefs are predicted by 
their reliance on the inherence heuristic, as proposed. I focused on a broad age span in this 
study (children between the ages of 4 and 7) to ensure that children’s beliefs about nominal fit 
would show sufficient variability. 
Methods 
 Participants. Sixty-four children (half girls and half boys) were recruited from a small city 
in the Midwestern US (age range = 4.18 to 7.96 years, M = 5.89, SD = 1.15). Although 
demographic information was not formally collected, the children were socioeconomically 
diverse, and most were European American.   
 Procedure. Children received two sets of questions: one set measured their nominal fit 
beliefs and the other measured their use of the inherence heuristic. The order of the two sets of 
questions was counterbalanced across participants. Each set was accompanied by pictures to 
maintain children’s attention.  
 Measures. 
 Nominal Fit. Nominal fit is the idea that the words people use are, at some level, right or 
fitting, and thus that no other word–object pairings would have worked as well. To measure 
endorsement of this idea in a child-friendly way, I presented children with brief vignettes that 
asked whether familiar objects (e.g., zebras) could have had another name or whether they had 
to have the name they do. Believing that the name couldn’t have been otherwise might indicate 
that children believe there is a special fit between objects and their assigned names. Below is the 
script for one of the vignettes: 
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Ok, so a long time ago, people didn’t have a name for this kind of animal. [The 
experimenter points to a picture of a zebra.] They didn’t have a name for it, and they 
wanted to come up with one. How did they do that? When people were first coming up 
with a name for this animal, did they have to call it a zebra, or could they have called it 
something else, like a diby or a peara?  
The task included three other vignettes identical to that above, except about different words: 
giraffe, lion, and bear. Each trial used a different pair of novel words as alternatives to the 
conventional word. The order of the two response alternatives (i.e., that the object had to have 
that name vs. that the name could have been different) was constant across trials for any one 
child but was counterbalanced across subjects. The order of the four vignettes was also 
counterbalanced.  
 This measure was constructed so as to avoid some of the concerns that have been raised 
about previous measures in the literature. First, I sought to minimize the possibility that nominal 
fit responses would stem from a misunderstanding of the question as being about the object, 
not the word (e.g., Osherson & Markman, 1975). The task blocked this sort of misunderstanding 
by making it very explicit that they were being asked about the link between the name and the 
object (“They didn’t have a name for it, and they wanted to come up with one. How did they do 
that?”). Second, the task scaffolded children’s understanding of the critical question about the 
hypothetical alternative names by first setting the stage for this question (“Ok, so a long time 
ago, people didn’t have a name for this kind of animal…”), thereby minimizing the difficulties 
associated with counterfactual reasoning (Rosenblum & Pinker, 1983).  
 In addition, because the two response alternatives were long, children could respond 
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non-verbally by pointing to one of two body parts. For example, children could touch their chin 
to select one alternative and their ear to select the other. The mapping of the two gestures to 
the two response alternatives was counterbalanced across children. To minimize the memory 
load, the experimenter always reminded children which gesture goes with which answer just 
before asking them to respond. This method allowed children to answer without having to 
verbally articulate the option with which they agreed. (For a previous use of this procedure, see 
Cimpian & Park, 2014).  
 Children’s responses were coded as 1 if they selected the nominal fit option (e.g., they 
had to call it a zebra) and as 0 if they selected the other option. Children’s scores across the four 
trials were averaged to derive a composite score that could range from 0 to 1, with higher scores 
indicating stronger intuitions about nominal fit.   
 Inherence Heuristic. The measure of children’s reliance on the inherence heuristic was 
borrowed from a prior series of studies investigating the developmental trajectory of this 
explanatory process (Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014). None of the items in this measure concerned 
words; rather, they pertained to non-linguistic aspects of the world (e.g., the fact that coins are 
round). For each item, children were asked three types of questions. The first type measured 
children’s explanatory preferences. Children were presented with inherent explanations (e.g., 
coins are round “just because they are coins”) and extrinsic explanations (e.g., coins are round 
“just because people thought it might be a nice idea”) and were asked to evaluate them on a 4 
point scale (“really not right” = 1, “a little not right” = 2, “a little right” = 3, “really right” = 4). 
These explanations were intentionally nonspecific in the inherent feature or societal fact used. 
Such generality enables the respective explanations to cover a wide range of possible 
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explanations that children might have generated on their own. Therefore, children could agree 
with an explanation despite the fact that it didn’t mention the particular feature or fact that they 
might have spontaneously thought best explains the phenomena.  
The second and third types of questions tapped intuitions that follow from inherence-
based explanations. If a particular pattern is explained in inherent terms (e.g., some feature of 
coins explains why they’re round), one might also reasonably assume that this pattern cannot be 
changed and is temporally stable. Thus, the second type of question assessed whether children 
thought it would be okay to change the relevant pattern (e.g., “Imagine if people wanted coins 
to be a different shape, and everyone agreed that they wanted coins to be a different shape. 
Would it be okay to make a change so that coins are not round, or would it not be okay?”). 
Children made their answers on a scale from 1 (“okay”) to 4 (“really not okay”). Finally, the third 
type of question assessed whether children thought the relevant pattern had always been and 
would always be as it currently is (e.g., “Do you think coins have always been round, even way 
back when the first ever coin was made?”). Children’s “yes” answers were scored as 1, and their 
“no” answers were scored as 0.  
 Each of the questions was asked about three items (coins are round; birthday cakes have 
candles; and school buses are yellow).  The order of these items was counterbalanced, as was 
the order of the three types of questions. Children’s answers were standardized within each 
question and then combined into an inherence heuristic composite score (α = .63), with higher 
scores indicating greater reliance on the output of this explanatory process. 
 Control variables. To address potential alternative explanations for the hypothesized 
relationship between nominal fit beliefs and inherence-based explanations, the analyses 
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included two control variables. First, both nominal fit beliefs and use of the inherence heuristic 
might covary with children’s age. The nominal realism literature has consistently found a 
developmental trend away from realist reasoning about words (e.g., Brook, 1970; Osherson & 
Markman, 1975; Piaget, 1967). Similarly, use of the inherence heuristic has been shown to 
decline somewhat with age (Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014). Therefore, it is possible that the two 
variables of interest would correlate simply because they both happen to decrease with age (and 
not because beliefs about the suitability of words are rooted in an inherence heuristic in 
explanation). I therefore adjusted for children’s exact chronological age in the analyses. Note 
that this adjustment can also account, at least to some extent, for the potential influence of 
other variables that are strongly age-linked (e.g., cognitive ability, language skill). 
 Second, experience with multiple languages is usually accompanied by more 
sophisticated reasoning about the arbitrariness of words (e.g., Bialystok, 1987; Cummins, 1978; 
Ianco-Worrall, 1972; Rosenblum & Pinker, 1983). This factor might also affect the output of the 
inherence heuristic, insofar as children with a wider variety of linguistic and cultural experiences 
might have a wider variety of information (including extrinsic information) to draw on when 
generating an explanation (e.g., Kinzler & Sullivan, 2014). To address this potential confound, I 
measured children’s exposure to multiple languages by asking parents whether they spoke any 
languages other than English to their child at home. Children’s score on this dimension was the 
number of languages other than English that they had been exposed to (M = .19, SD = .43, range 
= 0 to 2). 
 Data analyses. The dependent variable (i.e., nominal fit beliefs) in this and all subsequent 
studies in Part 1 was non-normally distributed, as indicated by Shapiro-Wilk tests. I took two 
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steps to accommodate the nature of these data: First, I used bootstrapping techniques (1,000 
replications) to derive standard errors, p values, and bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) 95% 
confidence intervals for the multiple regression estimates reported in Part 1 (Studies 1-6). 
Second, I used nonparametric, rank-based tests (namely, Mann-Whitney U) for any between-
group comparisons (see Study 6).   
Results and Discussion 
 If nominal fit beliefs are rooted in inherent reasoning, children’s reliance on inherence-
based intuitions should predict unique variance in their nominal fit beliefs, above and beyond 
their chronological age and their exposure to multiple languages. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, children’s inherence heuristic composite scores significantly predicted their nominal 
fit scores in a regression analysis controlling for age and multilingualism, b = .26 [.15, .38], SE = 
.05, p < .001 (see Appendix A for the full correlation matrix and Appendix B for the means). 
 The other outcomes of this regression were consistent with prior work: First, nominal fit 
beliefs decreased with age, b = −.13 [−.19, −.06], SE = .03, p < .001. Second, exposure to multiple 
languages was associated with lower endorsement of nominal fit beliefs, b = −.19 [−.31, −.07], SE 
= .07, p = .006. 
 It is worth noting that the results above were replicated when just the questions that 
assessed explanations per se were used as a measure of children’s reliance on the inherence 
heuristic (that is, leaving out the questions about change and stability). This narrower measure of 
reliance on the inherence heuristic still predicted children’s nominal fit beliefs, b = .17 [.07, .28], 
SE = .05, p < .001. Thus, the most direct measure of children’s explanatory preferences also 
predicted unique variance in their beliefs about the fit between names and objects. 
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 To conclude, these findings support the first prediction: namely, that children’s use of the 
inherence heuristic in making sense of the world predicts their belief that words and their 
referents are suitably connected.  
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Chapter 4: Study 2 
 Study 2 tested the second prediction of the current account—that reliance on the 
inherence heuristic should be correlated with endorsement of nominal fit beliefs even in adults. 
This prediction follows directly from the argument that nominal fit beliefs are the consequence 
of an inherence heuristic in explanation—a heuristic that is influential in adults’ reasoning as 
well, not just children’s (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014a, 2014b; Hussak & Cimpian, 2015; Salomon & 
Cimpian, 2014). Note, however, that this is a conservative test of the proposal because intuitions 
about nominal fit are likely to be (at best) weak among literate, educated adults. In fact, prior 
theories have explicitly maintained that intuitions about nominal fit are just an intermediate 
stage in the development of children’s metalinguistic knowledge (e.g., Brook, 1970; Piaget, 1967) 
and should thus be absent from adults’ reasoning altogether. 
 Additionally, I explored another possible interpretation of the predicted relationship: 
Perhaps nominal fit beliefs and inherence-based explanations are related simply because they 
co-occur in people with less complex cognitive styles (e.g., Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 
2000). That is, individuals who—regardless of their cognitive abilities—prefer simple, black-and-
white judgments or dislike effortful cognitive activity might be more likely to adopt both nominal 
fit beliefs and heuristic explanations, which would, in and of itself, give rise to a correlation 
between these two types of judgments. I explored this possibility by statistically adjusting for two 
widely used measures of cognitive style: the Need for Closure Scale (Kruglanski, Webster, & 
Klem, 1993) and the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). I expected that 
participants’ explanatory preferences would predict unique variance in the extent to which they 
endorse beliefs about word–referent fit, above and beyond the two measures of cognitive style. 
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Methods 
 Participants. Undergraduate students from a large US university (N = 126; Mage = 20.6 
years; 72% female) participated in this study.10 Approximately half of the students completed the 
study online, whereas the other half completed it in a psychology computer lab. An additional 
participant was tested but excluded from the final analyses for failing the catch items in the 
Inherence Heuristic Scale (see below). 
 Measures. 
 Nominal Fit. I developed an eight-item nominal fit measure (α = .65) to capture adults’ 
intuitions concerning whether words are particularly suitable or appropriate for their referents 
(see Table 1 for sample questions). Participants’ average rating across the eight items served as a 
dependent variable in the analyses. Unsurprisingly, average endorsement of nominal fit was 
fairly low overall (M = 2.14 on a 1–7 scale, SD = 0.85, range = 1.00 to 4.38). 
 Participants were also asked to justify their scale ratings. These justifications provided a 
means of assessing the construct validity of the measure. If participants’ scale ratings truly tap 
into their nominal fit beliefs, then these beliefs should also be detectable in their open-ended 
justifications. The justifications were coded independently by two researchers (both of whom 
were blind to participants’ scale ratings) for the extent to which they expressed beliefs about the 
fit between words and referents (1 = no nominal fit; 2 = unclear; 3 = nominal fit). Inter-rater 
agreement was excellent (kappa = .82).11 Coders’ ratings of these open-ended justifications 
correlated highly with participants’ scale ratings, r(124) = .72, p < .001, which provides evidence 
                                                     
10
 Due to a programming error, demographic information was collected from only 78 participants. 
11
 Twenty subjects were used for training the second coder, and thus reliability was calculated over 106 participants. 
I used a prevalence- and bias-adjusted kappa formula that was designed for ordinal coding scales (see Byrt, Bishop, 
& Carlin, 1993).  
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for the construct validity of the scale measure. That is, participants’ scale ratings seem to 
genuinely capture the extent to which they view word–referent pairings to be non-arbitrary. A 
sample of the justifications that revealed a belief in nominal fit can be found in Table 2. (Overall, 
66.7% of participants provided at least one such justification.) To take an example, when asked 
whether yaroo could have been a suitable name for what is now called a zebra, one participant 
reasoned that, “Maybe it would work, but zebra sounds more suitable to me. Maybe it’s because 
of the stripes.” 
 Finally, to test whether the eight items indeed measure a single latent construct (namely, 
a belief in nominal fit), I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis using a correlated uniqueness 
model that allowed the error terms of similarly-structured items to correlate (Kenny & Kashy, 
1992; Marsh, 1989). The hypothesized one-factor model provided a good fit to the data (χ²[8, N 
= 126] = 12.10, p = .147; RMSEA = .064; SRMR = .039; CFI = .968), consistent with the claim of a 
single underlying dimension (see Hu & Bentler, 1999, for additional information about 
interpreting fit indexes).  
 Inherence Heuristic. The Inherence Heuristic Scale consisted of 15 randomly ordered 
items that assessed participants’ tendency to rely on inherent explanations (e.g., “It seems 
natural that engagement rings typically have diamonds”). Extensive evidence concerning the 
construct validity, internal consistency, and factor structure of this scale can be found in 
Salomon and Cimpian (2014). The scale included four catch items (e.g., “It seems right to kill 
people for fun”) designed to screen out participants who were inattentive. Participants who 
failed two or more of these items (e.g., agreeing that it is right to kill people for fun) were 
excluded from the final analyses (n = 1). For this scale and the two described below, participants 
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marked their answers on a scale from 1 (disagree strongly) to 9 (agree strongly). 
 Need for Closure. The Need for Closure Scale consisted of 42 randomly ordered 
statements that assessed participants’ preference for order, simplicity, and quick, unambiguous 
judgments (e.g., “I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently”; Kruglanski et al., 
1993).  
 Need for Cognition. The Need for Cognition Scale consisted of 18 randomly ordered 
statements that assessed participants’ motivation to engage in effortful cognitive activity (e.g., “I 
find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours”; Cacioppo et al., 1984).  
Results and Discussion 
 In line with the present proposal, participants’ scores on the Inherence Heuristic Scale 
were a significant predictor of their nominal fit beliefs even when adjusting for the two measures 
of cognitive style, b = .24 [.09, .39], SE = .07, p = .002 (see Table 3 for full regression results, 
Appendix A for the correlation matrix, and Appendix B for the means). Neither measure of 
cognitive style uniquely predicted participants’ nominal fit scores. Together, these findings 
suggest it is unlikely that the relationship between nominal fit beliefs and inherent explanations 
is an artifact of their co-occurrence in individuals with less complex cognitive styles. Rather, 
these results are more compatible with the current proposal, according to which beliefs about 
an inherent link between names and objects are simply an instantiation of a broader reliance on 
inherent explanations in making sense of the world. 
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Chapter 5: Study 3 
 Study 3 was modeled on Study 2, with two main changes. First, because animal names 
are occasionally non-arbitrary (e.g., onomatopoeia such as cuckoo or chickadee), I revised the 
nominal fit measure so that it asked about artifact names instead (e.g., fork). This change should 
provide a more conservative estimate of participants’ nominal fit beliefs, as well as increase the 
generalizability of our conclusions. 
 Second, I included a new pair of control variables, which can address two more 
alternative explanations for the findings so far: Perhaps nominal fit beliefs and inherent 
explanations are related just because they happen to co-occur in individuals who (1) have lower 
fluid intelligence, or (2) are less creative. These individuals may be less able to imagine the 
myriad ways in which our words could have been different, and, independently, they may also be 
more likely to explain heuristically. In contrast to this alternative, I predict that the relationship 
between nominal fit and inherence will be present even when accounting for these cognitive 
variables. 
Methods 
 Participants. Participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (N = 122; Mage = 
36.2 years; 51% female). In this and all subsequent studies with adults, Mechanical Turk 
participants were paid $0.75. An additional eight participants were tested but excluded from the 
sample because they failed the catch items in the Inherence Heuristic Scale. 
 Measures. The measures of inherent reasoning and nominal fit were administered as in 
Study 2, except that the nominal fit measure asked about artifacts instead of animals. As in Study 
2, two researchers independently coded participants’ justifications for their scale ratings on the 
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nominal fit measure (kappa = .81). The codes assigned to these justifications were again strongly 
correlated with participants’ scale ratings, r(120) = .57, p < .001, suggesting that the latter truly 
tap into participants’ beliefs about the word–object link. Overall, 38.5% of participants provided 
at least one open-ended justification that indicated a belief in nominal fit. 
 Fluid Intelligence. I used a subset of Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1960), 
a standard test of fluid intelligence. Participants were required to solve 12 pattern completion 
problems. The problems were presented for 1 minute each, in increasing order of difficulty. 
Scores were calculated by summing the number of correct responses.  
 Creativity. Participants completed Gough’s (1979) Creative Personality Checklist, a widely 
used measure of creativity. Participants indicated which of 30 personality traits described them. 
Scores were calculated by adding the number of selected traits that had previously been found 
to correlate with creative achievements (e.g., “original”) and subtracting the number of selected 
traits negatively associated with such achievements (e.g., “cautious”). Trait order was 
randomized.  
Results and Discussion 
 The findings were again consistent with the second prediction that adults’ inherent 
explanations would be related to their nominal fit beliefs. Participants’ scores on the Inherence 
Heuristic Scale significantly predicted their nominal fit beliefs in a regression analysis that 
adjusted for fluid intelligence and creativity, b = .23 [.06, .41], SE = .08, p = .004 (see Table 3 for 
full regression results, Appendix A for the correlation matrix, and Appendix B for the means). 
These findings suggest that intelligence and creativity cannot account for the relationship 
between people’s explanatory tendencies and their endorsement of beliefs about word–object 
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fit. Instead, the results of this study provide more evidence supporting the claim that the 
inherence heuristic is a source of nominal fit intuitions. 
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Chapter 6: Study 4 
 Study 4 provided a further test of the second prediction (namely, that adults’ reliance on 
heuristic explanations would be related to their belief in the non-arbitrariness of words). 
Additionally, Study 4 explored the possibility that this predicted relationship may be due to 
individual differences in either (1) counterfactual thinking (which might suppress both nominal 
fit beliefs and inherent explanations; e.g., Salomon & Cimpian, 2014; Stanovich & West, 1997) or 
(2) exposure to multiple languages, and by extension, multiple cultures (which, as argued in 
Study 1, could likewise lower both variables of interest; e.g., Bialystok, 1987; Kinzler & Sullivan, 
2014).  
Methods 
 Participants. Participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (N = 122; Mage = 
36.0 years; 57% female). An additional seven participants were tested but excluded from the 
sample because they failed the catch items in the Inherence Heuristic Scale (n = 6) or because 
they indicated during debriefing that they had not paid attention to the survey (n = 1). 
 Measures. The measures of nominal fit beliefs and inherent explanations were 
administered exactly as in the preceding study (Study 3). Inter-coder agreement for participants’ 
open-ended justifications on the nominal fit measure was again high (kappa = .72), as was the 
correlation between this coding and participants’ scale responses, r(120) = .68, p < .001. Overall, 
51.6% of participants provided at least one open-ended justification that indicated a belief in 
nominal fit. 
 Counterfactual Thinking. To measure counterfactual thinking, I used a two-item scale 
from Stanovich and West (1997; e.g., “My beliefs would not have been very different if I had 
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been raised by a different set of parents” [reverse-scored]). Responses to each item were 
recorded on a scale from 1 (disagree strongly) to 9 (agree strongly). 
 Multilingualism. Participants were first asked how many languages other than English 
they were familiar with. Next, participants rated how fluent they were in each of these languages 
on a scale from 1 (limited familiarity [e.g., a year of instruction in school]) to 5 (native speaker 
[learned from birth]). Participants’ multilingualism scores were then calculated by adding up 
their fluency ratings across however many languages they were familiar with, other than English 
(M = 2.07, SD = 2.70, range = 0 to 17).  
Results and Discussion 
 The results mirrored those from Studies 1–3. Once again, participants’ tendency to rely 
on inherence-based intuitions was a significant, unique predictor of their beliefs in the non-
arbitrariness of words, even when controlling for their counterfactual thinking and their 
exposure to multiple languages, b = .27 [.09, .45], SE = .09, p = .003 (see Table 3 for full 
regression results, Appendix A for the correlation matrix, and Appendix B for the means). These 
results reinforce the argument that the heuristic processes people rely on to explain the world in 
general also underlie how they make sense of the mapping between words and objects.  
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Chapter 7: Study 5 
 Unlike Study 1, the three adult studies so far (Studies 2–4) did not measure participants’ 
endorsement of actual inherent explanations. Rather, these studies tapped intuitions that follow 
from inherent explanations (e.g., “It seems natural that engagement rings typically have 
diamonds”; Salomon & Cimpian, 2014). For a more direct assessment, in Study 5 participants 
were presented with two sets of explanations that explicitly appealed to inherent features (see 
Table 4): a set that consisted of inherent explanations about a wide range of non-linguistic facts 
(which I termed Inherence–Global) and a set that focused more narrowly on the linguistic 
relation between names and objects (which I termed Inherence–Language). Using these new 
measures, I tested whether the global tendency to explain the world inherently is accompanied 
by a more specific tendency to explain the mapping between words and objects inherently, 
which then promotes intuitions about nominal fit. In the context of a mediation model, there 
should be a significant indirect path linking participants’ scores on the Inherence–Global scale 
with their endorsement of nominal fit via their scores on the Inherence–Language scale (see the 
diagram in Figure 1).  
 For a stronger test of this prediction, I added two covariates to the mediation model. The 
first was a version of the Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT; Frederick, 2005)—a widely used 
measure of heuristic thinking. I predicted that participants’ heuristic explanations will account 
for unique variance in nominal fit beliefs, above and beyond participants’ general propensity for 
heuristic thinking (as measured by the CRT). The second covariate assessed the extent to which 
participants view randomness and chance as influencing their lives (Levenson, 1981). Perhaps a 
tendency to underestimate the influence of chance leads people to explain the world by 
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appealing to inherent (rather than extrinsic) facts, as well as to endorse beliefs about nominal fit. 
Contrary to this alternative, I predicted that the hypothesized path linking inherent explanations 
with nominal fit beliefs will remain significant even when adjusting for participants’ 
understanding of chance. 
Methods 
 Participants. Participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (N = 128; Mage = 
33.9 years; 54% female).12 An additional 13 participants were tested but excluded from the 
sample because they failed more than one catch item across the scales (see below). 
 Measures. Participants completed five scales in randomized order. The measure of 
nominal fit beliefs was administered exactly as in Studies 3 and 4 (and thus focused on artifact 
names). Inter-coder agreement for participants’ open-ended justifications on the nominal fit 
measure was again high (kappa = .84), as was the correlation between this coding and 
participants’ scale responses, r(126) = .65, p < .001. Overall, 46.1% of participants gave at least 
one nominal fit explanation in their open-ended justifications. 
 The Inherence–Global Scale. The Inherence–Global scale consisted of eight explanations 
for diverse phenomena (see top of Table 4 for full list; α = .82). All explanations included explicit 
mention of inherent features. Participants indicated their agreement with each explanation on a 
scale from 0 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree). This measure also included two catch 
items with obvious answers (one true, one false). 
 The Inherence–Language Scale. The Inherence–Language scale consisted of eight 
explanations for specific word–object pairings (see bottom of Table 4 for full list; α = .93). Similar 
                                                     
12
 Two participants did not provide demographic information. 
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to the Inherence–Global scale, all explanations included explicit mention of inherent features. 
Participants indicated their agreement with each explanation by using a sliding marker on a scale 
that ranged from 0 (completely disagree) to 100 (completely agree). This scale also included two 
attention checks that asked participants to move the sliding marker to one end of the scale. Any 
participant who missed more than one of the four attention/catch items across the Inherence–
Global and Inherence–Language scales was excluded from the final sample (n = 13). 
 Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). I used a version of the CRT (Frederick, 2005) that was 
superficially different from the original so as to avoid previous exposure among Mechanical Turk 
workers (Finucane & Gullion, 2010; see also Salomon & Cimpian, 2014). The task consisted of 
three word problems with salient and intuitive, but incorrect, answers. For example, one 
problem was as follows: “If it takes 2 nurses 2 minutes to measure the blood pressure of 2 
patients, how long would it take 200 nurses to measure the blood pressure of 200 patients?” 
The easy, heuristic response to this problem is 200 minutes, but the correct response is actually 
2 minutes. Responses were coded as either correct (= 1) or incorrect (= 0), and then summed 
across the three items. Higher scores on the CRT indicate more analytic (and less heuristic) 
reasoning. 
 The Chance Scale. To measure participants’ appreciation for the role of chance events, I 
used five items from Levenson’s (1981) Chance scale (e.g., “To a great extent, my life is 
controlled by accidental happenings”). Response options ranged from −3 (strongly disagree) to 
+3 (strongly agree), with no midpoint. The scores were summed across the five items, and 15 
was then added to the grand total so as to arrive at a possible range of 0 to 30 (with greater 
scores indicating greater appreciation for the importance of chance).   
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Results and Discussion 
 According to the present proposal, participants’ heuristic tendency to make sense of the 
world in inherent terms should be apparent in their reasoning about word-object relations as 
well, which should in turn lead participants to see a special fit between words and their 
referents. This predicted path (global inherence → inherence about words → nominal fit) was 
indeed significant in a bootstrapped product-of-coefficients mediation analysis, ab = .05 [.02, 
.10], SE = .02, Sobel test p = .020 (Hayes, 2013; see Appendix A for the full correlation matrix and 
Appendix B for the means).13 The direct effect from global inherence to nominal fit was 
nonsignificant, c’ = .01 [-.09, .11], SE = .05, p = .828. 
 Next, to test whether the proposed model provides a better fit to the data than other 
possible models of the relationships between these three variables, I switched the dependent 
variable (nominal fit) and the mediator (inherence about words). According to my proposal, 
people’s inherent explanations of word–object mappings precede (and give rise to) their beliefs 
about nominal fit, not vice-versa. Thus, I predicted this alternative model would be less 
compatible with the data. Indeed, the path tested in this model (global inherence → nominal fit 
→ inherence about words) was not statistically significant, ab = .05 [−.03, .14], SE = .04, Sobel 
test p = .257. This result provides additional confidence in the hypothesized model.   
 In a separate set of analyses, I added the CRT and the Chance Scale as covariates to the 
                                                     
13
 Surprisingly, the zero-order correlation between the Inherence–Global scale and the nominal fit scale did not 
reach significance, r(126) = .11, p = .227. Further inspection of the data revealed that the relationship between 
these variables was not linear. Rather, this relationship had a significant (and negative) quadratic component, b = 
−.03 [−.06, −.001], SE = .02, p = .040, in addition to a significant (and positive) linear component, b = .46 [.10, .83], SE 
= .19, p = .014. Specifically, the two variables showed a robust positive linear relationship over most of the 
Inherence–Global scale, a relationship that flattened off at the high end of this scale (hence the negative quadratic 
component). In sum, the non-significant correlation coefficient masks a much stronger positive relationship 
between Inherence–Global and nominal fit scores over most values of the Inherence–Global scale. 
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original mediation model. The predicted path linking global reliance on inherent explanations 
with endorsement of nominal fit beliefs through reliance on language-specific inherent 
explanations remained significant, ab = .04 [.01, .08], SE = .02, Sobel test p = .045 (see Figure 1 
for full results). Moreover, switching the mediator and the dependent variable again led to a 
non-significant indirect path, ab = .03 [−.03, .10], SE = .03, Sobel test p = .436. 
 In sum, these results provide further evidence for the prediction that adults’ reliance on 
inherent explanations to make sense of the world, and of word–object mappings in particular, 
may lead to intuitions that words are a good fit for their referents. 
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Chapter 8: Study 6 
 The evidence thus far suggests that the belief in a fit between words and their referents 
in both children and adults is related to their inherence-based reasoning, even when controlling 
for a variety of alternative factors. In this final study of Part 1, I tested the causal direction of this 
relationship (the third prediction): Would manipulating participants’ tendency to explain 
inherently lead to subsequent changes in their endorsement of beliefs about the inherent 
suitability of words? 
Methods 
 Participants. Participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and an 
undergraduate subject pool (N = 500; Mage = 35.6 years; 61% female). All participants completed 
the study online. An additional 61 participants were tested but excluded from the sample for the 
following reasons: (1) because they indicated they had not paid attention during the study (n = 
5), (2) because they guessed the purpose of the study when asked at the end of the session (n = 
17), or (3) because they failed a comprehension check (n = 39) (see below for details). 
 Procedure and Materials. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions 
that differed in whether they undermined or reinforced participants’ tendency to explain via the 
inherence heuristic (the Anti-Inherence and Pro-Inherence conditions, respectively). After the 
manipulation, participants completed a distractor task (which helped disguise the manipulation), 
followed by a measure of nominal fit and a brief manipulation check. 
 Manipulation. Participants read an article as part of a task on “reading comprehension 
and memory.” In both conditions, the article was titled, “Ever Wonder, ‘Why Do We Do It That 
Way?’” and focused on the example of why recycling bins are blue. In the Anti-Inherence 
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condition, the article explained that the color blue was a “historical accident,” having been 
chosen for no particular reason by the founders of the first recycling program in southern 
Ontario. The article went on to provide more examples of extrinsic forces that shape the way we 
do things (e.g., marketing campaigns, influential people). This information was designed to 
undermine participants’ typical explanatory intuitions, which focus on the inherent natures of 
the things explained rather than extrinsic factors. The article in the Pro-Inherence condition was 
similar in many respects to that in the Anti-Inherence condition (e.g., length, layout, and 
examples) except that it claimed blue was chosen because of its visibility and its ability to endure 
damage from the sun (inherent properties). The article then went on to provide more examples 
illustrating how the way we do things is in accord with the inherent natures of those things, and 
is thus optimal (e.g., scientists conduct experiments to determine how to do something 
optimally). This information was designed to reinforce participants’ typical, inherence-based 
explanatory intuitions. 
 After reading one of these articles, participants in both conditions completed a series of 
reading comprehension and memory questions, in keeping with what they had been led to 
believe was the purpose of the task. In addition to camouflaging the manipulation, these 
questions allowed us to test whether participants read and understood the information in the 
manipulation articles. In particular, one of the comprehension questions asked participants to 
choose which of four statements best summarized the main argument of the article. The correct 
answer should have been obvious to anyone who read the passage. Thus, this question served as 
an attention check as much as a comprehension check. Participants who answered this question 
incorrectly were excluded from subsequent analyses (n = 39, as mentioned above). 
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 Distractor. Following the manipulation, participants completed a three-minute distractor 
task consisting of four spatial puzzles. 
 Nominal Fit. I used the measure of nominal fit beliefs from Studies 3–5. 
 Manipulation Check. Finally, I asked participants to rate their agreement with four items 
designed to check whether the manipulation was effective in influencing their explanatory 
tendencies (e.g., “A lot of things that are true today are the way they are because of historical 
accidents that could have been otherwise” [reverse-coded]). These items were always presented 
last, just before the demographic questions. Participants marked their answers on a 1 (disagree 
strongly) to 9 (agree strongly) scale. 
Results and Discussion 
 The manipulation check revealed the expected condition difference, with the Pro-
Inherence participants showing a stronger preference for inherence-based reasoning than the 
Anti-Inherence participants (Ms = 5.09 and 4.22, respectively; both SDs = 1.19), Mann-Whitney Z 
= 8.15, p < .001. The key question, however, was whether this manipulation would affect 
participants’ beliefs about the word–object link. As predicted, participants in the Pro-Inherence 
condition showed stronger intuitions about nominal fit (M = 2.21, SD = 0.86) than participants in 
the Anti-Inherence condition (M = 2.08, SD = 0.94), Mann-Whitney Z = 2.08, p = .038. In further 
support of the current claim, the effect of the Pro- vs. Anti-Inherence manipulation on nominal 
fit beliefs was mediated by participants’ inherence-based reasoning (as measured by the 
manipulation check), ab = .12 [.06, .19], SE = .03, Sobel test p < .001 (see Figure 2 for the full 
mediation model). Once again, the direct effect was nonsignificant, c’ = .01 [-.15, .12], SE = .09, p 
= .882, suggesting that the influence of the manipulation on participants’ nominal fit beliefs was 
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fully mediated by the effect of the manipulation on participants’ inherent reasoning.  
 Thus, experimentally manipulating participants’ reliance on the inherence heuristic had a 
downstream effect on their tendency to see words as fitting with their referents. These findings 
support the proposal that this explanatory process gives rise to intuitions about the non-
arbitrary nature of words.  
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Chapter 9: Discussion of Part 1 
Theoretical Contributions  
 The studies from Part 1 make two important contributions. First, they provide evidence 
for the psychological reality of the belief that words fit, or are somehow suitable for, their 
referents. Nominal fit beliefs were present not only in children’s reasoning but were also 
articulated quite explicitly by many literate American adults (e.g., “The name sounds fitting for 
what it’s meant to do”; see Table 2 for additional examples). The second contribution of this 
work is that it proposes and tests a potential mechanism underlying these beliefs about nominal 
fit. I hypothesized that these beliefs are a product of how people make intuitive sense of the 
world more generally. Recent arguments and evidence suggest that many everyday, in-the-
moment explanations are generated using a heuristic process that leads people to routinely 
appeal to inherent facts, which are highly accessible in memory (Cimpian, 2015; Cimpian & 
Salomon, 2014a, 2014b; Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014; Salomon & Cimpian, 2014). Given that this 
process is invoked to explain a wide range of observations, it is reasonable to suppose that it 
would also shape people’s understanding of why objects have the names they do. Due to this 
heuristic, people might assume that word–referent pairings are explained by inherent aspects of 
the words or referents themselves rather than by social conventions established in the distant 
historical past. For example, as one of the adult participants suggested, perhaps a zebra’s stripes 
are part of the reason for the name zebra, which suggests that this name is fitting. The six 
studies reported here support the claim that such nominal fit beliefs stem from the broader 
tendency to explain heuristically. It is also worth noting that the results of these studies 
converged on the same conclusion despite considerable variation in the designs they employed 
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(correlational vs. experimental), in the characteristics of their participants (4- to 7-year-olds vs. 
undergraduates vs. Mechanical Turk workers), and in the questions they used to assess 
participants’ nominal fit beliefs and their reliance on the inherence heuristic. In summary, these 
results highlight the promise of the proposal that use of the inherence heuristic is at the root of 
beliefs about the fit between objects and their names. 
Why Do Beliefs about Nominal Fit Persist into Adulthood? 
 The results of these studies suggest that even adults show traces of a belief that words 
are suitable for their referents. Why would this be? Surely the (literate American) adult 
participants would have had plenty of opportunities to realize that language is arbitrary. In 
today’s world, for example, it is nearly impossible to avoid exposure to different languages and 
thus to different ways of referring to the same objects; many of the subjects even spoke more 
than one language. Why weren’t such experiences sufficient to dispel any doubts about the 
arbitrariness of language?14 I argue that, in and of themselves, linguistic differences of this sort 
do not necessarily undermine the idea of nominal fit. It is not logically inconsistent to believe 
that names fit their referents while simultaneously acknowledging that different languages use 
different words for the same thing. The fact that, say, dog and perro refer to the same animal 
does not preclude the possibility of explaining both inherently: Perhaps the two words are 
rooted in, or inspired by, two different aspects of the animal and are thus both a good match. 
Words can fit an object in many respects. More generally, it is by no means obvious that the only 
way to make sense of the existence of multiple words for the same thing is to assume that words 
are largely arbitrary. Arriving at this conclusion might actually require more systematic effort 
                                                     
14
 Exposure to different languages may be informative up to a point: In Study 1, children with such exposure showed 
greater understanding of the arbitrariness of words. 
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than is typically expended in the course of ordinary cognitive activity. 
 A related reason for the persistence of nominal fit beliefs might be that the evidence that 
could potentially weaken such beliefs is often not the most accessible when we’re looking for a 
quick, in-the-moment answer. Although many people of course realize that, say, a bowl is called 
by very different names in other languages, this fact may not be the first thing that comes to 
mind when thinking about why a bowl is called a bowl. Rather, retrieval may be dominated by 
inherent facts about the entities in the explanandum (the object and the word), which then gives 
rise to an inherence bias in the heuristic explanations generated. This is, I would argue, 
analogous to how many people are aware of counterexamples to familiar non-linguistic 
regularities (e.g., engagement rings without diamonds) and still often fail to factor this less-
accessible evidence into their explanations (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014a, 2014b; Salomon & 
Cimpian, 2015). In both cases, the explananda are typically understood as being rooted in 
inherent facts and thus as being natural and how things should be (e.g., Hussak & Cimpian, 2015; 
Tworek & Cimpian, 2015).  
Nominal Fit Intuitions: Shallow or Sophisticated?  
 So far, I have assumed that nominal fit beliefs are the product of shallow, heuristic 
processes. One might argue, however, that the participants could have also endorsed these 
beliefs for sophisticated, well-thought-out reasons. For example, if a participant assumes that (1) 
animal names in English are derived from their scientific names in Latin, and (2) scientific names 
function as descriptions of sorts (rather than being entirely arbitrary), perhaps it is reasonable to 
also assume that current English names are, in this roundabout way, not entirely arbitrary. 
Similarly, perhaps participants gave nominal fit responses because they extrapolated from the—
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occasionally non-arbitrary—ways that new words are introduced into English usage. For 
example, the photographs that people take of themselves are now called selfies (the word of the 
year in 2013, according to the Oxford Dictionaries). Participants may have reasoned by analogy 
that, just as neologisms like selfie or podcast seem to provide meaningful descriptions of their 
referents, established words such as zebra or candle might likewise provide a good fit for their 
referents.  
 The view that participants’ nominal fit responses stemmed from sophisticated chains of 
inferences such as those illustrated above is contradicted by at least two aspects of the data. 
First, endorsement of nominal fit beliefs in the current studies was positively correlated with 
endorsement of explanations that are heuristic rather than the result of careful thought. It 
seems unlikely that the same participants would effortfully puzzle their way through one set of 
questions (i.e., the nominal fit questions) and rely on effort-saving heuristics for another (i.e., the 
inherence heuristic questions). Second, the pattern of relationships between endorsement of 
nominal fit intuitions and other variables measured in these studies is exactly the opposite of 
what would be expected under this alternative. For instance, endorsement of nominal fit was 
negatively correlated with children’s age (Study 1), with adults’ fluid intelligence (Study 3), with 
their counterfactual reasoning ability (Study 4), and with the degree to which they reasoned 
analytically (Study 5). These results suggest that the source of intuitions about nominal fit is less 
examined and rational than proposed by this alternative hypothesis and more consistent with 
the proposed interpretation of participants’ responses. 
Future Directions 
 On a final note, I hope that one of the lasting contributions of the present work will be to 
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spark new research on people’s reasoning about the arbitrariness of language. There is much 
important work left to be done here. For instance, one potential avenue for future work is to 
investigate the relationship between the present findings and other lines of research that 
similarly suggest people underestimate how arbitrary language is. To illustrate, people also tend 
to assume that (1) idioms such as “spill the beans” or “take the bull by the horns” connect quite 
transparently, rather than arbitrarily, with their meanings (e.g., Keysar & Bly, 1995) and that (2) 
the grammatical gender of a noun (in languages that employ this syntactic device) provides a 
match to the characteristics of its referent (e.g., Boroditsky, Schmidt, & Phillips, 2003). Are the 
similarities between the data presented here and these other studies coincidental, or are they 
perhaps due to an underlying similarity in mechanism? And, if the latter alternative is correct, is 
the common mechanism explanation-based? 
 To conclude Part 1, the above studies identify a surprisingly robust belief that words fit 
their referents. Additionally, they provide evidence that this belief is due to an inherence 
heuristic in how people generate explanations. This work adds an important piece to our 
understanding of people’s basic conceptions about language, and it illustrates the extent to 
which heuristic explanations underlie people’s fundamental theories about how the world 
works. 
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Chapter 10: Part 2. Inherent Reasoning Provides Important Foundations for  
Children’s Essentialist Beliefs 
People commonly believe (at least implicitly) that members of natural and social 
categories (e.g., lions, boys, African Americans) share an internal substance or “essence” that 
causes their category’s typical properties (e.g., having manes, being interested in fixing things; 
e.g., Gelman, 2003; Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Kinzler & Dautel, 2012; Medin & Ortony, 1989). 
This belief is revealed in phrases such as, “it’s in their bones” or “it’s in their blood.” Phrases of 
this sort emphasize the extent to which a trait is stable and predictive. For instance, in a news 
article about the caste system in India, someone explained, “it’s in their blood and they carry it 
with them all of the time” (D’Souza, 2015) Powerful essentialist beliefs like those about castes 
are common across a wide variety of categories. Furthermore, essentialist beliefs are not 
particular to specific cultures (e.g., Birnbaum, Deeb, Segall, Ben-Eliyahu, & Diesendruck, 2010; 
Gelman, Meyer, & Noles, 2013; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Waxman, Medin, & Ross, 2007) nor to 
particular ages (e.g., Gelman, 2003; Gelman, Heyman, & Legare, 2007). Beyond their being 
ubiquitous, essentialist beliefs encourage overgeneralization of traits across category members 
and insensitivity to nuances that exist within the category. Given the broad scope of influence 
that essentialist beliefs have on people’s reasoning, it is important to understand the origins of 
essentialist beliefs. 
Here, I propose that a key part of the foundation on which essentialist beliefs are built is 
set by inherent reasoning. Before discussing the proposal in detail, I will first describe important 
past work on essentialism and its origins. I will then outline why general explanatory heuristics 
might play an important role in setting up essentialist beliefs. Finally, I will describe three studies 
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that lend support to this proposal and make important headway in the investigation of the 
origins of essentialist beliefs.  
Various uses of the term “essentialism” 
To be clear, when I use the term “essentialism” or “essentialist beliefs,” I will be referring 
to psychological essentialism specifically (i.e., the way people mentally represent categories and 
their members), rather than metaphysical or biological essentialism (i.e., the actual existence of 
essences in the real world). Beyond this simple clarification, I need to further specify what beliefs 
I am investigating the origins of, as even within the literature on psychological essentialism, the 
term “essentialism” has been used to refer to various beliefs. To do so, I will first outline some of 
the nuances in way the term is used. 
There are multiple potential components of an essentialist belief; however, theorists put 
these components together in different combinations, all of which are labelled “essentialism.” 
Some use a relatively bare definition, whereby an essence is a central part of a concept, its 
underlying reality, which is sometimes responsible for certain properties (however, exceptions in 
displaying these properties are not indicative of a lack of essence; e.g., Medin & Ortony, 1989). 
Others agree that the essence is a non-specific “placeholder” of sorts, in that people don’t know 
exactly what it is, but these theorists believe that more can be said about how people conceive 
of essences (e.g., Bloch, Solomon, & Carey, 2001; ; Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Gelman, 2003; 
Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Keller, 2005; Kinzler & Dautel, 
2012; Newman & Keil, 2008; Rosengren, Gelman, Kalish, & McCormick, 1992; Taylor, Rhodes & 
Gelman, 2009; Uhlmann & Zhu, 2013; Yzerbyt, Corneille, & Estrada, 2001). Qualifications that are 
commonly included are a belief that the essence is (1) substantial and internal, (2) that it can be 
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used to identify individuals’ underlying, true and natural category membership (at least in 
principle), and (3) that this same substance is causally responsible for category members’ typical 
properties (Gelman, 2003). 
In most cases, essentialist beliefs are said to span natural categories (such as animals and 
chemical elements) and social categories (such as gender and race; e.g., Gelman, 2004; Gelman 
& Heyman, 1999; Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002; Rhodes, Leslie, & 
Tworek, 2012). However, others extend this belief to cover artifact categories (e.g., Bloom, 
1996). The argument is that, if one were to look at what an object was intended to be, the 
intentions of the creator would mirror important aspects of what constitutes an essentialist 
belief for natural and social kinds (e.g., Bloom, 1996). For instance, all objects that were 
intentionally and successfully created to be a vase are in fact vases. From this perspective, once 
someone knows the intention behind an object’s successful creation they will always know its 
true kind membership—in this way, the intention of the creator is similar to the essence for 
natural categories. Note, however, how different these two notions of an essence are: One is 
substantial and located within each member of the category, while the other is neither.15 
Overall, people’s essentialist beliefs about artifacts and people’s essentialist beliefs about 
natural and social categories seem to stem from different notions of an essence. And even within 
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 Others still, discuss individuals as having their own essences (e.g., Hitler had a “Hitler-essence”; Leslie, 2013; 
Newman, Diesendruck, & Bloom, 2011). Individual essences are most often discussed in contexts where an 
individual contaminates objects with their essence. The remnants of the essence on the objects is then capable of 
contaminating other individuals with which it comes in contact, and in turn the essence transferred might cause the 
contaminated individual to have similar properties as the individual from which the essence originated. Importantly, 
there are key differences in a belief in this type of essence and category essences (e.g., the transferred traces of the 
essence are not thought to cause the identity of the contaminated individual to change, and the traces can imbue 
graded degrees of the original individual’s properties rather than making the contaminated individual mirror the 
original individual). Because of the differences in the properties of essences when considering an individual essence 
and a category essence, in this paper I will focus on category essences only. 
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essentialist beliefs about natural and social kinds, the specifics of the belief researchers are 
arguing about are inconsistent. The variability in what one might be referring to when discussing 
essentialist beliefs necessitates being specific about which beliefs one is in the business of 
investigating the origins of, in part because the different ideas of an essence might stem from 
different cognitive mechanisms. Here, I focus on finding the origin of a belief that strongly 
influences people’s daily reasoning and is widely studied in the field—the belief that members of 
natural and social kinds share a microstructural, internal, category-indicative, and causally 
powerful essence (Gelman, 2003; Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Keil, 2003; Keil, 1989; Rhodes et al., 
2012).16 I will use the term “essentialism” to represent this specific belief.   
Essentialism strongly influences the predictions and inferences people make daily (e.g., 
Gelman & Heyman, 1999; Haslam et al., 2002; Kinzler & Dautel, 2012; Leslie, 2013; Meyer, Leslie, 
Gelman, & Stilwell, 2013; Waxman et al., 2007; Yzerbyt et al., 2001), and also gives people a 
sense that they understand the mechanism that underlies many category features (see Keil, 
2006; Rozenblit & Keil, 2002; Trout, 2002 for how confidence accompanies a sense of 
mechanistic understanding).  For instance, not only might people predict that the dog at the park 
will bark and have similar propensity for certain diseases as other dogs, but their essentialist 
beliefs give them a more concrete sense of knowing why—because dogs share an internal 
substance. While confidence in daily inferences can help people go about their day smoothly, 
such confidence can also encourage people to overlook nuanced differences among category 
members and treat members of a group as if they were interchangeable copies of one another. 
For instance, people’s essentialist beliefs will justify their assumptions that a female will be best 
                                                     
16
 This belief can include the idea that DNA fills the role of an essence, though it need not. 
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at taking care of a crying child and a male will be best at fixing the sink (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 
2011; Haslam et al., 2002; Keller, 2005). While on the surface these consequences may seem 
relatively small, on a larger scale they can give rise to systematic prejudice and harmful 
stereotyping. It is thus critical to better understand the initial source of essentialist beliefs to 
know when and why these consequences arise, and how most effectively to avoid them when 
they are harmful. 
Possible Sources of Essentialist Beliefs 
 Multiple proposals have been discussed for the origins of essentialist beliefs; however, as 
a field we remain far from a comprehensive understanding. In the next section, I will outline 
some of the primary contenders for the origins of essentialist beliefs and why they fall short of 
being able to explain the available data. Subsequently, I will outline the current proposal of an 
important part of the foundation for the emergence of essentialist beliefs—a foundation found 
in general explanatory processes.  
First, it is possible that essentialist beliefs come from an accurate perception of essences 
in the world (see Gelman, 2003; Gelman & Hirschfeld, 1999 for discussion of these arguments). 
However, contrary to many people’s essentialist beliefs, there is no scientific evidence of an 
internal substance that causes all of the category-typical properties that kind members share. 
Even DNA cannot accurately predict a person’s personality traits, ethnicity, sexual orientation, 
disabilities, and so on (see Keil, 1995 and Leslie, 2013 for excellent arguments against the 
existence of essences in the world). While there are some features in the world that help to 
distinguish category members, these fail to categorize with 100% accuracy, and often do not play 
a causal role in a member’s properties.  
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Second, essentialist beliefs may be conveyed socially, through other people—perhaps 
through language or cultural messages more generally (e.g., Gelman, Taylor, & Nguyen, 2004). 
Consistent with this possibility, children are more likely to endorse essentialist beliefs about a 
novel social category after hearing several generic facts about it (i.e., facts that apply to the 
entire category; Rhodes et al., 2012). Importantly, however, generic statements such as “girls 
like pink” do not in and of themselves convey the notion of an essence. Saying “girls like pink” 
does not in and of itself convey a notion of an internal cause of this preference. Therefore, a 
general concept of an essence would need to have already been entertained before children’s 
essentialist beliefs would be affected by such language. Furthermore, people rarely, if ever, 
discuss essentialist beliefs per se (e.g., that girls all share something inside that makes them like 
pink), through generic language or otherwise (e.g., Gelman et al., 1998). More plausibly, generic 
facts might influence which categories people essentialize, once essentialist beliefs have already 
been entertained in some form. Thus, it seems as though learning from others is not a primary 
source of essentialist beliefs. 
Another possibility is that our cognitive systems are structured in a way that fosters the 
development of essentialist beliefs. There are at least two distinct ways they might do so. Some 
theorists argue that a domain-specific, innate module facilitates essentialist inferences about 
biological kinds specifically (e.g., Atran, 1998; see also Barrett, 2001; Gil-White, 2001). This 
module theory holds that this predisposition to essentialize biological kinds might then 
generalize to kinds that are not biologically based (e.g., Spanish speakers and water; Gil-White, 
2001; Haslam et al., 2000). However, the view that biological essentialism is the product of an 
innate module does not fit with two aspects of the available data. First, the claim that children 
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use their essentialism for biological kinds to infer essentialist views about social kinds predicts 
that essentializing biological kinds would come online prior to that for social kinds. Children 
would need time to draw an analogy from biological to social categories.17 However, essentialist 
beliefs about animal categories and social categories seem to emerge around the same time in 
children (e.g., Birnbaum et al., 2010; Gelman, 2003; Taylor, Rhodes, & Gelman, 2009). Second, it 
is difficult for the module view to explain the variance in essentialist beliefs, both in the tendency 
to essentialize some biological (and social) categories more than others, as well as in the 
tendency for some individuals to essentialize more than others across the board (see Haslam et 
al., 2000, 2002, for evidence of this variability).  
Instead of a biological reasoning module, it might be the case that more general cognitive 
processes support the development of essentialist beliefs (Gelman, 2003; see also Keil, 1995). 
Susan Gelman (2003, pp.313-314) thoughtfully outlined multiple early-emerging, domain-
general “root capacities” that support essentialist beliefs. These include the ability to distinguish 
appearance from reality, the ability to make inductive inferences from property clusters, a belief 
in causal determinism, the ability to track identity over time, and a tendency to defer judgments 
to experts. Other likely elements are the ability to make inferences about individuals based on 
information about others of the same kind (e.g., Gelman & Markman, 1987; Graham, Kilbreath, 
& Welder, 2004), and an understanding of internal energy (e.g., Inagaki & Hatano, 2004; Leslie, 
1995; Luo, Kaufman, & Baillargeon, 2009). The “domain-general processes” argument is that as 
multiple domain-general cognitive abilities combine together to form essentialist beliefs. The 
                                                     
17
 It is highly unlikely that children would be able to draw such a complex analogy at the young ages that they 
express social essentialist beliefs (i.e., preschool) without very explicit aligning and discussion of essentialist beliefs 
by others (Gentner, Anggoro, & Klibanoff, 2011). And there is no evidence that this occurs (Gelman et al., 1998). 
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idea that essentialism emerges from more basic cognitive abilities and propensities has the 
advantage of allowing for wide variability in the categories and properties that are essentialized, 
as well as in the extent to which they are essentialized, depending on how the precursor abilities 
develop and combine within individuals.  
While it is reasonable to expect that the abilities and processes discussed above support 
essentialist beliefs, we don’t yet seem to have a sufficient list of abilities and beliefs that would 
bring children all the way to essentialism. For instance, it is difficult to see how a child might 
come to believe specifically that the same internal substance (or essence) causes all of an 
individual’s category-typical properties and is in principle able to indicate true category 
membership from the idea that reality may differ from what appearances suggest, the ability to 
make inductive inferences, and the belief that agents have an internal energy. There are details 
in a fully developed essentialist belief that seem unable to form out of the current precursors 
outlined in the literature. To gain a better understanding of the cognitive underpinnings of 
essentialist beliefs, it is important to test additional early emerging processes that might 
contribute to the eventual formation of essentialist beliefs. Here, I identify one key component 
of this developmental process that has not yet been discussed in previous work—namely, the 
process of generating intuitive explanations. 
The current proposal: Inherent reasoning facilitates the development of essentialism. 
Essentialist beliefs are often called upon to explain properties of natural and social kinds. Thus, 
these beliefs support a large portion of people’s explanations of their surroundings—they 
provide a framework for making sense of the world (Barrett, 2001; Gelman, 2003; Gelman & 
Wellman, 1991; Medin & Ortony, 1989). For instance, essentialist beliefs provide explanations 
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for why a dog barks, and why girls are nurturing—“it’s just in their blood.” But why do our 
explanations call upon the idea of an “essence” in these cases? Perhaps in looking at the process 
of explaining in more detail, new light might be shed onto why these essentialist beliefs are used 
as we make sense of the world. For instance, it might be the case that aspects of the process of 
explanation itself are structured in a way that promotes use of essentialist beliefs. In the next 
section, I will propose that the inherence bias in people’s everyday explanations plays a role in 
the development of essentialist beliefs. I will then outline evidence consistent with this proposal. 
 The role of inherent explanations in the development of essentialist beliefs. Because 
explanations can have a powerful influence on how people (both children and adults) make 
sense of the world, a skew in the content of those explanations will likely translate into a skewed 
view of the way the world works. In line with this idea, children’s reliance on the inherence 
heuristic may be one source of their beliefs that words are non-arbitrarily matched with their 
referents (see Part 1), that social inequalities are fair (Hussak & Cimpian, 2015), and that current 
patterns of behavior signal the way people should behave (Tworek & Cimpian, in press). As 
children repeatedly appeal to inherent features when making sense of their world, over time and 
in combination with other root capacities, coherent beliefs might form based on these 
explanations—perhaps more specifically essentialist beliefs. To speculate, inherent reasoning 
might draw children to the more general belief that it is usually something about the thing itself 
that makes it the way it is—likely something stable and integral to the thing being what it is, as 
these are the types of features that tend to be used in many explanations. In combination with 
an early understanding of internal energy, a developing sense of causal reasoning, as well as 
accumulating knowledge about biological insides, inherent reasoning might precipitate the 
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essentialist intuition that there is some inherent, internal feature that explains a category’s 
features. While testing the precise mechanisms by which inherent reasoning facilitates the 
emergence of essentialist is beyond the scope of this paper, here I describe the first steps in 
testing whether inherent reasoning lays an important part of the foundation for the 
development of essentialist beliefs.   
To clarify, inherent features and essences are similar, but distinct. They are similar 
because an essence is an inherent feature—it is completely within and about the member to 
which it belongs. Additionally, if an individual’s essence was changed, the individual itself would 
change—a key indication that a feature is inherent to the entity at hand (Cimpian & Salomon, 
2014a, 2014b). Importantly, however, an essence has characteristics that other inherent 
features do not have. The essence is microstructural, internal, causal, and defining of an 
individual’s category membership. In this way, inherent features and essences are not the same 
thing; inherent features form a much broader set. Also consistent with the idea that essentialism 
and inherent explanations are not the same construct, reasoning about essences appears to 
come online later in development compared to children’s more general inherent reasoning (e.g., 
Cimpian & Steinberg, 2004). This difference in emergence suggests that essentialism requires 
additional information or cognitive abilities on top of general inherent reasoning. In all, looking 
at an essence as a subtype of an inherent feature (an internal, category-specific, causal inherent 
feature) is broadly consistent with the view that essentialist beliefs emerge in part as a product 
of inherence-based reasoning. 
Recent Findings in line with the Proposal 
Prior work on essentialist beliefs in adults is consistent with the proposal that general 
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inherent reasoning facilitates the initial development of essentialist beliefs. For instance, adults’ 
endorsement of inherence-based explanations about conventions (e.g., wedding dresses being 
white) predicts the strength of their essentialist beliefs about social groups (e.g., Asians; Salomon 
& Cimpian, 2014). Similarly, even within individuals, adults’ essentialist beliefs shift depending on 
their reliance on inherent intuitions in the moment: When adults’ reliance on inherent intuitions 
was experimentally reduced, participants’ essentialist beliefs were consequently weaker 
(Salomon & Cimpian, in preparation). Moreover, when adults’ available cognitive resources were 
taxed with the use of a speeded task (increasing their likelihood of using heuristic processes), 
they showed heightened essentialist beliefs compared to participants who were forced to delay 
reporting their responses (Edison & Coley, 2013). This is consistent with our proposal because 
inherent explanations are often a product of a heuristic process (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014a, 
20014b; Hussak & Cimpian, 2015); thus, if inherent explanations give rise to essentialism, we 
might expect essentialist beliefs would be more strongly endorsed when people are reasoning 
heuristically. 
While these findings are broadly consistent with the proposal that inherent reasoning 
influences essentialist-based intuitions, they cannot speak to the influence of inherent thinking 
on the early development of essentialist beliefs. The adult data is consistent with the possibility 
that the link between the inherence heuristic and essentialism develops later in life. Given the 
findings reviewed so far, it remains possible that children’s essentialist beliefs develop 
independently of their explanatory tendencies. For a more direct test of the role of inherent 
explanations in the development of essentialism, it is important to investigate the early stages of 
development, when essentialist beliefs are first emerging. 
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Current Studies 
To test whether inherent reasoning lays part of the foundation for the development of 
essentialist beliefs, I focus my investigation on the developmental time point at which 
essentialist beliefs emerge (4 years of age; e.g., Gelman, 2003). Here, I provide the first test of 
this link across three studies with young children. First, I tested whether 4-year-old children’s 
inherence-based intuitions about conventions would predict the strength of their essentialist 
beliefs about animals (Study 7). Next, I tested the causal nature of this relationship by either 
encouraging or discouraging 4- to 7-year-olds’ reliance on inherence-based intuitions, and 
measuring the subsequent changes in the strength of their essentialist beliefs (Studies 8 and 9). 
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Chapter 11: Study 7 
 To test whether inherence-based reasoning lays the foundation for essentialist beliefs, I 
first investigated whether individual differences in children’s reliance on inherence-based 
reasoning predict the extent to which they endorse essentialist beliefs around the time at which 
children begin to express essentialist beliefs (4 years of age; Gelman, 2003). 
Methods 
Participants. Four-year-old children (N = 64, half boys and half girls; M = 4.4 years, SD = 
0.32; range = 4.0 to 5.0) participated in a quiet room at a research lab or in their school. They 
were socioeconomically diverse, and most were European American. 
Procedure. Children were given two sets of questions: one that captured their inherence-
based reasoning, and another that captured their essentialist beliefs. The order of the two sets 
was counterbalanced across children. 
Inherence-based reasoning. To assess the extent to which children explain general 
phenomena using inherent features, I used 4 different types of questions used in previous 
studies (Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014). The first three questions are exactly those used in Study 1: 
One asked children to rate inherent and non-inherent explanations, and two tested inferences 
that would follow from having reasoning inherently (that the phenomenon would be consistent 
over time, and that society has little influence on it). A fourth question was added here that also 
tested a belief that would follow from inherent reasoning—that the phenomenon at hand is 
non-arbitrary. This question is the same as that used in Study 1 as a measure of nominal fit 
beliefs. Each question was asked about two different social conventions (sampled from the 
following three conventions, in counterbalanced order across children: school buses being 
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yellow, birthday cakes having candles, or coins being round). I measured inherent reasoning 
about conventions involving artifacts, while essentialist beliefs were measured in a wholly 
different domain – animal categories. This way, any link found between these constructs cannot 
simply be attributed to shared content. Each question received a score that could range from 0 
to 1, where higher scores represented more inherence-based reasoning. I then averaged the 
scores to create an inherence composite for each child. 
Essentialist beliefs. To capture the strength of children’s essentialist beliefs, I used a 
variety of questions used in the literature: measurements of inductive potential (Gelman & 
Markman, 1987), stability of a property (Gelman & Heyman, 1999; Gelman, Heyman, & Legare, 
2007), innate potential (Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Gelman, Heyman, & Legare, 2007), and the 
importance of insides for determining category membership (Gelman & Wellman, 1991). To 
avoid overlap in content with the social conventions used to measure inherent reasoning, each 
of the questions was asked about properties of animal kinds (two randomly selected from among 
three: cats, dogs, or birds). As was done with the Inherence-based Reasoning measure, the 
questions were averaged to create a single essentialism composite score that could range from 0 
to 1, with higher scores indicating greater endorsement of essentialist beliefs. 
Inductive potential. If children believe that a category-specific, microstructural “essence” 
causes members of animal kinds to have the properties that they do, then, after learning that a 
particular member has a property, children may infer that other category members share the 
same property (e.g., Gelman & Wellman, 1991). To measure this inference, I showed children a 
picture of an animal and told them a non-visible property of the member (e.g., “Look at this cat. 
This cat has something called pedicles in its tail.”). I then showed children three different 
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members of the same kind, with varying visual similarity to the target, and asked whether they 
thought the new member had the same property (e.g., “Look at this cat. Do you think that this 
cat has pedicles in its tail like this cat [pointed to the original cat picture]?”; Gelman & Markman, 
1987). If they thought the member shared the property, they were given a score of 1, and if not 
a score of 0. The same was done for two other members of the kind. I then averaged children’s 
scores across the three novel members (and the two categories) to create a single inductive 
potential score, which was subsequently combined with the scores for other questions into the 
essentialism composite. 
Stability. Another consequence of having essentialist beliefs about the source of an 
animal’s properties is the belief that these properties are stable and unchanging.18 That is, if a 
particular property is due to the causal essence, and if this causal essence is present in the 
individual by virtue of its being a member of its kind, then that causal essence should always 
produce the property as long as the individual is a member of its category (e.g., Gelman & 
Heyman, 1999).19 To test this belief, I asked children whether a current property of an animal 
(e.g., “This cat does something called ‘flehming’”) was present at an earlier age (e.g., “do you 
think this cat did this thing called ‘flehming’ when it was 4 years old?”), and whether it would 
always have the same property (e.g., “do you think this cat will always do this thing called 
                                                     
18
 There are important differences between this measure of stability that is argued to measure a particular aspect of 
essentialism, and the measure of temporal consistency question used in the inherence-based reasoning scale. In the 
inherence-based reasoning scale, I always asked about artifact categories maintaining a property over the category’s 
existence (e.g., have birthday cakes, and will birthday cakes, always have candles). Essentialist beliefs would not 
support a response to these questions. 
19
 However, there are exceptions to this form of reasoning that are not seen as evidence against essentialist beliefs. 
A member of a category can go through significant changes in appearance and still be considered as maintaining 
their essence, and therefore their category membership (e.g., Keil, Smith, Simons, Levin, 1998; Rosengren, Gelman, 
Kalish, & McCormick, 1992). For instance, a caterpillar is seen as the same individual when it transforms into a 
butterfly. Similarly, one can groom a dog to look exactly like a cat, but it would still be considered a dog given its 
essence.  
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‘flehming’?”; Gelman & Heyman, 1999; Gelman, Heyman, & Legare, 2007). For each question, 
children were given score of 1 if they agreed and 0 if they disagreed, and the average of the two 
scores across the two categories made up their score for this question. 
Innate potential. A commonly measured outcome of essentialism is the belief that 
biological (“essence”-based) causes of properties are more influential than environmental causes 
(Gelman, Heyman, & Legare, 2007; Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Rhodes et al., 2012; Sousa, Atran, 
& Medin, 2002). Children in our study were shown two different animals (e.g., a dog and a horse) 
and were told about a property that differed between the two (e.g., the dog eats bones and the 
horse eats grass). Then, children were told that the dog had a baby, and right after the baby was 
born it went to live with the horse. The horse took care of the baby (e.g., “She played with the 
baby, fed the baby, and loved the baby”), and the baby never saw the birth mother or any other 
member of that kind again. After asking the children questions to ensure they understood the 
story, I asked whether they thought the baby (now 6 years old) has the property of the birth 
mother or the adoptive mother (e.g., “Do you think that the baby eats bones like this dog, or 
does it eat grass like this horse?”). If children chose the birth mother (an essentialist response), 
they received a score of 1, and if they chose the adoptive mother, a score of 0.  
Importance of insides for determining category membership. Two important aspects of 
essentialism are the belief that the essence is internal, and that it is indicative of category 
membership. To test these aspects of essentialism, I used a modified version of Gelman and 
Wellman’s (1991) test of whether the nonvisible insides or the visible properties of an animal 
were more indicative of its category membership. In the version I used, I told children that two 
groups of scientists were trying to make a “real live” animal (cat, dog, or bird). They were told 
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that one team had all the right insides (e.g., “It had dog bones and dog blood, and all of the other 
things a dog has on the inside”) but none of the right outsides (e.g., “dog skin and dog fur”). 
After children heard what the team made, and after they were asked memory questions to 
ensure understanding, children were asked whether or not the team’s creation was a member of 
the relevant animal category (e.g., “is what this team made a dog, or not a dog?”20). If they said 
that it was a member of the intended animal kind they were given a score of 1, and if not, a 
score of 0. The other team made the reverse product (i.e., all of the right outsides, but none of 
the right insides). I asked children follow-up memory and category identity questions for this 
team as well, but reversed the scoring so that children received a 0 if they judged the team’s 
creation with proper outsides but wrong insides to be a member of the relevant category. The 
scores from the two teams were then averaged. 
Results and Discussion 
The proposal that inherent reasoning is involved in the development of essentialist 
beliefs predicts that, around the time when essentialist beliefs tend to first emerge, children’s 
inherent reasoning would be correlated with their essentialist beliefs. As expected, preschoolers’ 
inherence-based reasoning (M = 0.61, SD = 0.19) predicted the strength of their essentialist 
beliefs (M = 0.60, SD = 0.17), r(62) = .38, p = .002 (see Table 5 for a correlation matrix).  
Both inherent reasoning and essentialist beliefs have been shown to change with age 
(Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014; Gelman, Heyman, & Legare, 2007). Therefore, while the age range 
for this study was rather restricted (4.0 to 5.0 years of age), it is still possible that the bivariate 
relationship between inherent reasoning and essentialism is simply a product of independent 
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 I counterbalanced the order of these response options across children. 
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changes in these variables with age. For a stronger test of a relationship between inherent 
reasoning and essentialism, I adjusted for children’s age in a multiple regression analysis. 
Consistent with my proposal, individual differences in inherence-based reasoning predicted 
children’s essentialism scores even when age was included in the regression, b = .34, SE = 0.10, p 
= .001. (Age did not significantly predict 4-year-olds’ essentialist beliefs, b = -.10, SE = 0.06, p = 
.117.) This analysis also suggests that other potential confounds that vary strongly with age (e.g., 
language development, executive functioning) cannot fully account for the relationship of 
interest. Overall, this study is consistent with the proposal that the inherence heuristic facilitates 
the development of essentialist beliefs. However, experimental work is necessary to test 
whether inherent reasoning plays a causal role in the emergence of essentialism. 
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Chapter 12: Study 8 
In Study 8, I tested a stronger prediction of the argument that inherence-based reasoning 
facilitates the development of essentialist beliefs. Would manipulating the extent to which 
children rely on inherent explanations in turn affect the extent to which they essentialize? If 
essentialist beliefs emerge as an elaboration of inherent intuitions, we might expect the answer 
to be “yes.” To test this prediction, I read children a book intended to either promote or 
discourage inherence-based reasoning, measuring subsequent changes in the strength of 
children’s essentialist beliefs. In this study I used a wider age range (4 to 7 years of age, divided 
into younger and older children), to allow for more variability in children’s essentialist beliefs.  
Methods 
Participants. Four- to seven-year-old children (N = 112, half boys and half girls; M = 5.94 
years, SD = 1.13; range = 4.08 to 7.98) participated in a quiet room at a research lab or in their 
school. They were socioeconomically diverse, and most were European American. 
Procedure. I first assessed the strength of children’s essentialist beliefs using the 
questions in Study 7 across two animal items. Next, I read them a story book intended to 
promote or discourage inherence-based reasoning. After reading the book, I assessed children’s 
essentialist beliefs in the context of two other animals. The animal categories used before and 
after the book reading, as well as their order within the pre- and post-test, was counterbalanced.  
 Essentialist beliefs. The questions used to measure children’s essentialist beliefs were 
similar to those used in Study 7 with a few exceptions. First, I added a new animal trial (about 
frogs) so as to have a total of four different items (two pre- and two post-book). Second, because 
reading the book with the children took a relatively long time, I removed the question about the 
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importance of insides vs. outsides in determining category membership (which was the most 
involved) from the measure to keep the study at a more reasonable length. 
Inherence-based reasoning manipulation. Children listened to a story book described as a 
book that talked about “why some things are the way they are.” The book was titled “Why?” and 
consisted of 4 “chapters” that each discussed a different social convention (drinking orange juice 
for breakfast, coins being round, fire trucks being red, and clapping when someone does a good 
job). For half of the children (Pro-inherence condition), the book provided inherent explanations 
for the social conventions (e.g., that there are features of the entities involved that best explain 
why we do things that way). For the other children (Anti-inherence condition), the book provided 
various facts to promote extrinsic explanations (e.g., “people decided that they wanted it to be 
that way”; see Appendix A for a sample script).  
After each chapter, the children were asked to describe what they heard in the book to a 
stuffed animal. I used these answers as a comprehension/attention check. Children were 
considered to have followed along with the book if, for each of the four “chapters” they were 
able to repeat any of the facts mentioned in that chapter (which consisted of only a few 
sentences). My prediction of a causal link between inherent reasoning and essentialism is 
strongest for children who were able to process and retain at least some elements of each 
chapter’s message. It was for these children that I expected to see the clearest effect of the book 
manipulation on essentialist beliefs.  
Each book (pro-inherence or anti-inherence) had two possible chapter orders. At the end 
of the book, the children were asked to brainstorm with the experimenter about what a new 
chapter in the book could be about. This part was intended to encourage further engagement 
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with the ideas children had just read about. The experimenter made a suggestion and 
appropriate prompts to keep the child in line with the general idea of the book (see Appendix A 
for the script). 
Data Analysis. The data were submitted to a multilevel model with the following 
predictors: Condition (Pro-inherence vs. Anti-inherence), Age Group (4- and 5-year-olds vs. 6- 
and 7-year-olds), Phase (Pre-manipulation vs. Post-manipulation), Manipulation Comprehension 
(those who followed along with the book vs. those who did not), and all of the corresponding 
interactions. Additionally, I allowed the intercepts for each subject, item, and question type to 
vary randomly. This analysis helped account for the variability that exists among children’s 
essentialist beliefs, as well as any variability that might be attributed to particular items and 
questions used in the procedure. Because children’s essentialism scores were not normally 
distributed, I used bootstrapping (1,000 replications) to calculate standard errors, p values, and 
95% confidence intervals. 
Results and Discussion 
I predicted that the change in children’s essentialism scores from pre-manipulation to 
post-manipulation would depend on whether they were read the pro-inherence book or the 
anti-inherence book. However, I also expected the effect of condition on the change in children’s 
essentialism scores would be strongest for those children who could repeat elements of the 
chapters they had been read. That is, I expected a stronger two-way Condition (Pro- vs. Anti-
Inherence) × Phase (Pre- vs. Post-manipulation) interaction for children who understood the 
books than for those who did not, which would be reflected in a three-way Condition × Phase × 
Comprehension interaction.  
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The two-way Condition × Phase interaction (including all participants) was not significant, 
b = .04 [-.03, .11], SE = .04, p = .315. However, as expected, the three-way interaction with 
Comprehension was marginally significant, b = .15 [-.01, .30], SE = .08, p = .056 (see Tables 6 for 
the complete regression table and Table 7 for the means). To examine the source of this three-
way interaction, I split the data into two groups: those children who passed the comprehension 
questions (n = 41) and those who did not (n = 71). These follow-up analyses revealed that 
children who followed along with the book showed pre- to post-manipulation changes in their 
essentialist beliefs that were highly dependent on condition. In other words, they showed a 
significant Condition  Phase interaction, b = .13 [.02, .25], SE = .06, p = .014, with a significant 
increase in essentialism in the Pro-inherence condition (Mpre = .48 vs. Mpost = .57, b = .10 [.03, 
.17], SE = .04, p = .002) and a slight decrease in the Anti-inherence condition (Mpre = .59 vs. Mpost 
= .57, b = -.04 [-.12, .05], SE = .05, p = .47). However, children who did not follow along with the 
book did not show this Condition × Phase interaction, b = -.02 [-.10, .06], SE = .04, p = .616 (see 
Table 7 for the means). There was no effect of Age, nor did any interactions with Age reach 
significance (see Table 6 for the complete regression table). 
The findings in this study are consistent with the proposal that inherent reasoning lays an 
important foundation for children’s essentialist beliefs. The children who understood the 
manipulation books displayed changes in the strength of their essentialist beliefs, and these 
changes were dependent on their having been read pro-inherence or anti-inherence books 
about social conventions. This finding is striking given that the content of the books and the 
essentialism measure were quite distinct (one being about why firetrucks are red, for example, 
and the other about whether a baby born from a cat and raised by a pig would have a straight or 
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curly tail).  
There were also, however, a few aspects of the data were not predicted a priori. While 
these findings do not in and of themselves contradict my proposal, they are worth further 
discussion. First, many children did not follow along with the books used in the manipulation. In 
hindsight, the scripts in each book chapter may not have connected their arguments well enough 
to the overall “why?”-question associated with the chapter (e.g., why are coins round?), in turn 
hindering children’s ability to follow along. In other words, although the facts provided on each 
page were relatively easy to understand (e.g., coins having faces on them, and faces are round), 
children may have had some difficulty understanding how this information was relevant for 
answering the corresponding “why?” question. Along similar lines, the chapters were structured 
in a way such that the children heard three distinct arguments presented on successive pages. 
Perhaps it was difficult for the children to follow multiple arguments presented in such quick 
succession (see Appendix C for a sample script). Second, the effect found was driven by children 
in the Pro-inherence condition, as children in the Anti-inherence condition did not have lower 
essentialism scores in the post-test. To speculate, it might be the case that supporting children’s 
inherent intuitions is feasible through a subtle manipulation while getting children to go against 
their intuitive explanations, on the other hand, may be more difficult to accomplish, especially 
with just one book reading. 
The above issues with the current manipulation may be addressed with a few changes to 
the manipulation books used. Perhaps if the chapters presented the arguments in a narrative 
structure, and the books had an introduction and conclusion to help children tie the chapters to 
the more general inherent and non-inherent ways of reasoning, more children would follow 
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along. These changes may also help children in the Anti-inherence condition to better 
understand and appreciate the non-inherent reasoning used.  
One other aspect of the data that was surprising was the fact that the children in the Pro-
inherence condition who followed along with the books had particularly low pre-test 
essentialism scores (see Table 7). To determine the reason for these low scores, I looked for 
differences on a variety of factors between this subsample (i.e., Pro-inherence children who 
followed along with the books) and the other groups of children. This sample matched the 
children who were in the same condition but did not follow along, as well as children in the Anti-
inherence condition who followed along, on the following variables: the items they received in 
the pre-test, the question order and chapter order they were assigned to, as well as the 
locations they were tested (lab vs. school). The only difference found between the subsamples 
was in age—not surprisingly, the children who followed along were somewhat older (M = 6.68 
years for those who followed vs. M = 5.51 years for those who did not). Critically, however, there 
was no age difference between the children who followed along in the Pro- and Anti-inherence 
conditions (MPro = 6.65 years vs. MAnti = 6.72 years), and thus the reason for the lower pre-test 
scores in the Pro-inherence condition is still unclear.  
Without a clear reason for distribution of pre-test essentialism scores, it was particularly 
important to conduct a replication of this study. Finding an effect of the Pro- vs. Anti-inherence 
manipulation in an independent sample of children would minimize the possibility that the 
present study found the predicted results simply due to a failure of random assignment. 
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Chapter 13: Study 9 
Study 9 was a close replication of Study 8, and thus a further test of the predicted causal 
relationship between inherent-based reasoning and essentialist beliefs.  
Methods 
Participants. Four- to seven-year-old children (N = 112, half boys and half girls; M = 5.95 
years, SD = 1.23; range = 4.0 to 8.1) participated in a quiet room at a research lab or in their 
school. They were socioeconomically diverse, and most were European American. 
Procedure. The procedure was the same as Study 8 with three changes. First, I changed 
the books to (a) have more of a narrative structure to facilitate children’s attention and interest, 
(b) include an introduction and conclusion to the book that discussed generally “why some 
things are the way they are” (see Appendix D), (c) omit the scaffolded brainstorming at the end, 
to keep the sessions from taking too long and overtaxing children’s attention. Second, again in 
the interest of keeping the testing session at a reasonable length, I only used one animal item to 
measure children’s essentialist beliefs before the book reading. I also removed the bird item 
from the set of counterbalanced items. Third, I changed the innate potential questions so that, 
for all items, children were asked about behavioral properties (rather than having some about 
physical properties, as these did not show much variability across children in the previous study).  
Results and Discussion 
The findings replicated those of Study 8. Most importantly, I again found a significant 
three-way Condition × Phase × Comprehension interaction, b = .20 [.04, .38], SE = .09, p = .021. 
As before, children who followed along with the book (n = 44) showed a significant two-way 
Condition × Phase interaction, b = .18 [.04, .30], SE = .07, p = .008, that was due to a significant 
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increase in children’s essentialism in the Pro-inherence condition (Mpre = .43 vs. Mpost = .58, b = 
.20 [.11, .28], SE = .04, p < .001) but not in the Anti-inherence condition (Mpre = .55 vs. Mpre = .57, 
b = .01 [-.08, 10], SE = .05, p = .828). In contrast, children who did not follow along with the book 
(n = 68) did not show a significant two-way Condition × Phase interaction, b = -.02 [-.11, .08], SE 
= .05, p = .682. Once again, there was no effect of Age, nor did any of the interactions with Age 
reach significance (see Table 8 for means and Table 9 for the complete regression table).  
Replicating Study 8, and consistent with my proposal, (some) children’s essentialist 
beliefs were influenced by reading a book that either encouraged or discouraged inherent 
reasoning. This finding further suggests that inherent explanations lay an important part of the 
foundation on which essentialist beliefs develop. Once again, however, many children did not 
follow along with the manipulation books, and the effect found was driven by children in the 
Pro-inherence group who did follow along. I discuss possible reason for these aspects of the data 
as well as future work that might test these explanations in the next section. 
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Chapter 14: Discussion of Part 2 
The findings from three studies (Studies 7-9) suggest a link between inherence-based 
reasoning and the development of children’s essentialist beliefs. At the age when essentialism 
begins to emerge (4 years), children’s inherent reasoning predicted the strength of their 
essentialist beliefs (Study 7). This relationship was observed despite the fact that inherent 
reasoning was only measured in domains that fall outside of the scope of essentialism (i.e., the 
inherent reasoning measure did not ask about natural kinds or social groups). Furthermore, the 
predictive relationship between inherent reasoning and essentialist beliefs was not accounted 
for by children’s age. In Studies 8 and 9, the strength of children’s essentialist beliefs was 
influenced by reading a book that explained various social conventions (e.g., why fire trucks are 
red). Half the children were read a version of the book that gave inherent explanations; the 
others were read a book that explained the conventions in terms of people’s influence on them. 
After simply being read arguments that support (or contradict) inherent reasoning, some of the 
children subsequently showed changes in the strength of their essentialist beliefs. These results 
provide a first test of the role that inherent reasoning plays in the emergence of essentialist 
beliefs, and they support the broader view that essentialism originates from domain-general 
cognitive processes. 
 As future studies build on the current work, it would be valuable to improve the 
effectiveness of the current inherent reasoning manipulation (i.e., the pro-inherence and anti-
inherence books). The manipulation was rather subtle—the books used to influence the 
children’s reasoning only explained four example phenomena with the intention of influencing 
children’s general explanatory reasoning. In addition, the children were only read the book once. 
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Two changes to the manipulation might improve its effectiveness in changing children’s 
reasoning. 
First, it is possible that the exposure to the books in the current study was simply not 
sufficient to induce a substantial change in children’s reliance on inherent intuitions. Perhaps if 
children had been read the books multiple times, even over multiple days (as was done in 
Gelman, Ware, & Kleinberg, 2010, and Rhodes et al., 2012), more children would have been 
affected by the book. This change might also enable more children to follow along with the 
books by providing more time to connect the specific explanations on each page to the more 
general way of reasoning that underlies each example. I predict that such a change would 
strengthen the effect of the pro- versus anti-inherence manipulation on children’s essentialism. 
Second, in addition to increasing the number of readings of the books, it would be 
valuable for the specific arguments in each book to more directly align with the more general 
aim of the manipulation (i.e., enhancing or reducing general reliance on inherent intuitions). The 
current books’ focus on four concrete phenomena may have been too distant to change 
children’s more general reasoning (even with the introduction and conclusion used in Study 9). 
Perhaps including more abstract general statements that give voice to an inherent or extrinsic 
mode of explanation (e.g., “there are a lot of things that make perfect sense because of the way 
they look or work” or “a lot of the time, people just make decisions about how to do something 
even though it could be done a lot of other ways too”) might have a stronger influence on 
children’s tendency to rely on their inherent intuitions more generally. Furthermore, to more 
directly test the efficacy of the manipulation, two additions to the procedure would be valuable. 
It would be useful to measure (1) whether children believed the arguments in the books, and (2) 
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to what extent children’s inherent reasoning was actually lowered by the Pro- versus Anti-
inherence manipulation (i.e., a manipulation check). If we assessed the changes in children’s 
inherent thinking in response to the manipulation, we could also test whether the effect of the 
manipulation on children’s essentialist beliefs was in fact mediated by changes in children’s 
inherent reasoning. However, adding such measures may not be practically feasible given that 
the experimental sessions in Studies 8 and 9 already seemed to have pushed young children’s 
attention spans to their limit. 
Nevertheless, even with the subtle manipulation of inherent reasoning used in Studies 8 
and 9, the findings from these studies are consistent with the idea that inherent reasoning forms 
part of the foundation for the initial development of essentialist beliefs. A question that remains, 
however, is the following: How exactly does inherent reasoning foster essentialist beliefs? One 
possibility is that children’s inherent explanations combine with other beliefs and cognitive 
abilities over time. Together, this aggregate set of general beliefs and cognitive abilities might 
make more easily available the notion of a specific type of inherent feature for natural and social 
kinds (i.e., an essence). For instance, perhaps inherent reasoning interacts with children’s 
noticing that natural kind members are often treated as equivalent or interchangeable. Children 
are often taught about general categories of animals (e.g., dogs) in the presences of a single 
member, as if the member is a mere representative for its category, and category members are 
alike. The realization that kind members are often treated as interchangeable might combine 
with reasoning that something about the category member explains the way it is (i.e., inherent 
reasoning) to give rise to the belief that inherent features are shared by category members. This 
belief might then take children one step (of many) closer to a more fully formed essentialist 
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belief by supporting the notion that a particularly important inherent feature might be shared by 
category members. Over time, children’s reasoning may develop into stand-alone essentialist 
beliefs that are invoked independently of inherent explanations.  
It is noteworthy that the tendency to explain inherently is domain general. Thus, the 
suggestion that it plays a role in setting up children’s initial essentialist beliefs is consistent with 
the broader view that essentialist beliefs originate from domain general cognitive processes. 
However, there remain gaps in our understanding of the complete foundation on which, and 
mechanism by which, children initially develop their essentialist beliefs. It isn’t clear what other 
general cognitive processes and beliefs facilitate the last step children take to reach fully 
developed essentialist beliefs. To investigate this, it is likely most informative to use a 
longitudinal design in which changes in domain-general knowledge and cognitive processes (e.g., 
knowledge of the insides of natural kinds, the belief in the coherence of natural kinds, beliefs 
about internal energy, and inherent reasoning) can be used to predict the initial development of 
essentialist beliefs. A longitudinal design would reveal how various cognitive factors and their 
interactions support the emergence of essentialist beliefs. 
A better understanding of the origins of essentialist beliefs can inform work on beliefs 
and behaviors that follow from essentialism, and thus also inform the mechanisms that underlie 
these beliefs and behaviors. Perhaps the downstream effects that are most critical to understand 
are those that follow from essentialist beliefs about social groups—specifically, stereotyping and 
prejudice. The current work suggests interventions that target the information that is highly 
accessible in memory. For instance, increasing the accessibility of extrinsic, environmental 
factors might decrease the likelihood that essentialist explanations are generated. More 
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specifically, by highlighting the variety of environmental influences on members of social kinds 
(e.g., culture-specific historical events), such non-inherent information might become much 
more accessible in memory and help people to avoid the typical inherent, and more specifically 
essentialist, reasoning. Along similar lines, making extrinsic information accessible early in life 
might significantly reduce the likelihood that essentialist beliefs, about at least some social 
groups, would develop at all. 
Overall, the current work advances our understanding the origins of essentialism. It 
supports the argument that essentialism develops out of domain-general reasoning processes 
and brings us a step closer to understanding how essentialist beliefs might develop from such 
domain-general processes.  
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Chapter 15: Conclusion 
The general tendency to explain phenomena with inherent features of the explananda is 
at the root of many common beliefs about how the world works. Across 9 studies, I provided 
evidence for the influence of inherent reasoning on people’s beliefs about the non-arbitrariness 
of words and their essentialist beliefs. Part 1 included 6 studies that suggested inherent 
explanations may underlie nominal fit beliefs in children and, to some extent, even in adults. 
Three additional studies in Part 2 provided initial steps towards understanding the role of 
inherent reasoning in the development of essentialist beliefs.  
These findings add to the body of evidence highlighting the important ways in which 
inherent explanations shape our reasoning (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014a, 2014b; Hussak & 
Cimpian, 2015; Tworek & Cimpian, in press). For example, in prior work the tendency to 
generate inherent explanations was also found to give rise to beliefs that legitimize the 
sociopolitical status quo (e.g., rich people have more money because they’re smarter; Hussak & 
Cimpian, 2015). The inherence bias in explanations might also contribute to the tendency to 
assume that the way things are (e.g., people typically give roses for Valentine’s Day) is the way 
they ought to be (e.g., people should give roses for Valentine’s Day; Tworek & Cimpian, in press). 
If people reason that inherent features of entities in an observed pattern of behavior explain 
why it is that way (e.g., roses are beautiful), they may also reason that the pattern is good and 
right—that is, they may imbue the pattern with sociomoral value. To illustrate, in the past, 
Americans might have reasoned that racial segregation in public places could be explained using 
the inherent features of those in each racial group, and if this way of doing things is thought to 
stem from stable features, it might seem natural and the way things should be.  
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Thus, the inherence heuristic seems to lay a foundation for not only nominal fit and 
essentialist beliefs, but also other psychological processes such as system justification (or 
defense of the status quo), and sociomoral evaluation. The fact that these judgments are 
influenced by the tendency to rely on highly accessible information when generating 
explanations suggests the value in investigating how abstract, higher-order judgments and 
beliefs are shaped by very basic cognitive processes. By adopting this perspective, new light may 
also be shed on common mechanisms that underlie seemingly disparate beliefs.  
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Tables 
Table 1 
Sample Items from the Nominal Fit Measure Used in Study 2 
Sample question #1:  
Consider long ago when people discovered the kind of animal above [referring to a picture of a 
lion] and decided to give it a name. In English, we call it a “lion.” Do you think there is 
something particularly appropriate about this name, or could we have just as easily called this 
animal something else? 
Answer scale: 1 (this name is particularly appropriate) to 7 (we could have easily called this 
animal something else) 
Sample question #2:  
Think back to a time long ago when people discovered the kind of animal above [referring to a 
picture of a pig] and decided to give it a name. In selecting this name, how many suitable 
options did they have? 
Answer scale: 1 (only a few suitable options) to 7 (countless suitable options) 
Sample question #3:  
The name “yaroo” would have been a suitable name for this kind of animal [referring to a 
picture of a turtle].  
Answer scale: 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
Sample question #4:  
Imagine the word “cow” was not an English word. That is, imagine we called cows something 
else in English and the word “cow” didn’t mean anything. Now imagine that at some point in 
the future English speakers decided to use the word “cow” for a kind of thing that didn’t yet 
have a name. In selecting a kind of thing to call “cow,” how many suitable options did they 
have?  
Answer scale: 1 (only a few unnamed things would be suitable) to 7 (pretty much any 
unnamed thing would be suitable) 
 
Note. Studies 3–5 used identical questions, except about artifact names (e.g., “bottle”).  
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Table 2 
Sample Justifications from the Nominal Fit Measure (Studies 2–5) 
 
… the long “a” in “giraffe” appears fitting for the long neck. 
 
Only a few different words could possibly describe a glove. 
 
“Yaroo” is two syllables and doesn’t really fit.  
 
I feel like the name fits the object better than anything else would. 
 
I feel like turtle was given its name for biological reasons and “yaroo” seems just arbitrary. 
 
I think it’s a fitting name [“giraffe”] although other names could be used, but I believe the way the word 
is pronounced it gives you a feeling of being stretched out like the giraffe’s neck. 
 
The [novel] name doesn’t fit the form and function of a chair, or anything you sit on for that matter. 
 
I think it might be difficult [to call a bowl “a fork”] because the word “bowl” kind of describes the “o” 
shape of the object. The fork doesn’t. 
 
It is called a “fork” because of the prongs on it, so [using the word “fork” for] a bowl would take away 
from its real name. 
 
“Yaroo” doesn’t give a sound like “chair,” to imply what you do with it. 
 
It [the novel word] doesn’t really match the object. 
 
… “bowl” does have some connotations due to how the mouth moves to make the sound. 
 
“Yaroo” doesn’t seem to fit the name for a chair. It just sounds wrong to me.  
 
The name sounds fitting for what it’s meant to do.  
Note. Quotes were added to participants’ justifications where needed to clarify when they were referring 
to the word or to the object. 
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Table 3 
Regression Analyses Predicting Participants’ Nominal Fit Beliefs in Studies 2–4  
Study Predictor      b      SE 
  BCa 95% 
  CI 
      p 
      
2 Inherence Heuristic .24 .07 [.09, .39] .002 
 Need for Closure .07 .09 [−.12, .24] .452 
 Need for Cognition .06 .06 [−.09, .18] .352 
 R2 total .11    
 F 4.81    
 N 126    
      
3 Inherence Heuristic .23 .08 [.06, .41] .004 
 Raven’s Progressive Matrices −.08 .04 [−.16, −.01] .022 
 Creative Personality Checklist −.01 .02 [−.05, .03] .805 
 R2 total .16    
 F 7.21    
 N 122    
      
4 Inherence Heuristic .27 .09 [.09, .45] .003 
 Counterfactual Thinking −.10 .04 [−.18, −.02] .029 
 Multilingualism .01 .04 [−.06, .13] .780 
 R2 total .15    
 F 7.01    
 N 122    
Note. BCa = bias-corrected and accelerated. 
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Table 4  
The Inherence–Global and Inherence–Language Scales 
The Inherence–Global Scale 
1) There is some feature of orange juice (maybe something about how it tastes or something else) that explains 
why we drink orange juice at breakfast. 
2) There is some feature of the color red (maybe something about how it looks or something else) that explains 
why red in a traffic light means “stop.” 
3) Girls generally wear pink because of something about the color pink—for example, it looks delicate and 
flower-like. 
4) Engagement rings typically have diamonds because of something about diamonds—for example, it might 
be something about how rare they are. 
5) The reason we don’t keep chipmunks as pets has to do with the way chipmunks act, or maybe something else 
about them. 
6) The reason wedding dresses are typically white has to do with the way white looks, or maybe something else 
about it. 
7) There is some feature of funerals that explains why we associate the color black with them. 
8) There is some feature of mint that explains why we use it to flavor toothpaste. 
The Inherence–Language Scale 
1) We use the word “frog” when talking about the amphibian because of something about the word—perhaps 
something about how it sounds or looks in print. 
2) We call clocks “clocks” because of something about the object—perhaps something about how it works or 
looks. 
3) The fact that we call giraffes “giraffes” can be explained by some feature of the animal—maybe something 
about how it looks or something else. 
4) The fact that we use the word “pizza” to talk about the food can be explained by some feature of the word—
maybe something about how it’s pronounced or something else. 
5) There is some feature of the word “cat” (maybe something about how it sounds or something else) that 
explains why it is used to talk about cats. 
6) There is some feature of ovens (maybe something about how they work or something else) that explains why 
the word “oven” is used to talk about them. 
7) The reason we call horses “horses” has to do with something about the animal—it could be something about 
how it looks or something else about it. 
8) The reason we use the word “milk” when talking about the white liquid has to do with something about the 
word—it could be something about how it’s pronounced or something else about it. 
 
Note. The Inherence–Global Scale also included the following two catch items: “There is something about your 
favorite sports team that explains why coffee keeps us awake” (false) and “The brightness of the day is usually due 
to the sun’s light, regardless of the season” (true). The Inherence–Language Scale also included two attention 
checks that directed subjects to slide the response bar to either end of the scale.  
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Table 5 
Bivariate Correlation Matrix from Study 7 
 Inherence-based 
reasoning 
Essentialist beliefs Age 
Inherence-based 
reasoning 
--- --- --- 
Essentialist beliefs .382** --- --- 
Age .058 -.162 --- 
** p < .01 
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Table 6 
Fixed Effects from the Main Mixed Multilevel Regression in Study 8 
Predictor b 
Bootstrap 
SE 
Bootstrap 
Percentile 95% CI 
p 
Condition -.004 .03 -.06, .05 .876 
Age .02 .03 -.03, .08 .406 
Phase .01 .02 -.02, .05 .507 
Comprehension -.06 .03 -.13, -.002 .050 
Condition × Age -.01 .05 -.12, .09 .816 
Condition × Phase .04 .04 -.03, .11 .315 
Condition × Comprehension -.13 .06 -.26, .01 .056 
Age × Phase .01 .03 -.06, .07 .752 
Age × Comprehension .01 .06 -.11, .14 .826 
Phase × Comprehension .03 .04 -.04, .10 .491 
Condition × Age × Phase -.08 .07 -.21, .05 .232 
Condition × Age × Comprehension .13 .12 -.11, .38 .226 
Condition × Phase × Comprehension .15 .08 -.01, .30 .056 
Age × Phase × Comprehension .03 .07 -.11, .18 .557 
Condition × Age × Phase × Comprehension -.04 .15 -.33, .27 .801 
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Table 7 
Mean Composite Essentialism Scores at the Subject Level from Study 8 with SDs in Parentheses 
 
 
 All Participants Followed the 
book reading 
N = 41 
Did not follow the 
book reading 
N = 71 
Pro-Inherence    
Pre-manipulation .56 
(.19) 
.48 
(.18) 
.63 
(.17) 
Post-manipulation .61 
(.18) 
.57 
(.21) 
.63 
(.15) 
    
Anti-Inherence    
Pre-manipulation .58 
(.18) 
.59 
(.17) 
.57 
(.19) 
Post-manipulation .58 
(.18) 
.57 
(.16) 
.59 
(.20) 
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Table 8 
Fixed Effects from the Main Mixed Multilevel Regression in Study 9 
Predictor b Bootstrap 
SE 
Bootstrap 
Percentile 95% CI 
p 
Condition .004 .03 -.05, .07 .835 
Age .01 .03 -.05, .07 .842 
Phase .07 .02 .03, .11 <.001 
Comprehension -.09 .03 -.15, -.02 .013 
Condition × Age -.03 .06 -.15, .10 .698 
Condition × Phase .05 .04 -.03, .14 .205 
Condition × Comprehension -.10 .06 -.21, .03 .131 
Age × Phase .04 .04 -.04, .12 .395 
Age × Comprehension -.02 .06 -.15, .11 .743 
Phase × Comprehension .05 .04 -.03, .14 .228 
Condition × Age × Phase -.13 .08 -.28, .03 .118 
Condition × Age × Comprehension .33 .25 -.16, .87 .167 
Condition × Phase × Comprehension .20 .09 .04, .38 .021 
Age × Phase × Comprehension -.11 .09 -.31, .06 .209 
Condition × Age × Phase × Comprehension -.10 .17 -.43, .23 .565 
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Table 9 
Mean Composite Essentialism Scores at the Subject Level from Study 9 with SDs in Parentheses 
 All Participants Followed the 
book reading 
N = 44 
Did not follow the 
book reading 
N = 68 
Pro-Inherence    
Pre-manipulation .58 
(.23) 
.43 
(.23) 
.65 
(.20) 
Post-manipulation .64 
(.18) 
.58 
(.14) 
.67 
(.18) 
    
Anti-Inherence    
Pre-manipulation .56 
(.24) 
.55 
(.23) 
.57 
(.26) 
Post-manipulation .60 
(.21) 
.57 
(.17) 
.62 
(.23) 
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Appendix A 
Table A1  
Correlation Matrices of the Measures in Studies 1–5 
      
Study 1 
Nominal 
Fit 
Inherence 
Heuristic 
Age 
Multilang. 
Exposure 
 
Nominal Fit    —     
Inherence Heuristic .53***    —    
Age −.43*** −.17    —   
Multilanguage Exposure −.09 .12 −.11    —  
     
 
Study 2 
Nominal 
Fit 
Inherence 
Heuristic 
Need for 
Closure 
Need for 
Cognition 
 
Nominal Fit    —     
Inherence Heuristic .31***    —    
Need for Closure .13 .28**    —   
Need for Cognition −.01 −.28** −.16    —  
     
 
Study 3 
Nominal 
Fit 
Inherence 
Heuristic 
Raven’s 
SPM 
Creative 
Personality 
 
Nominal Fit    —     
Inherence Heuristic .33***    —    
Raven’s SPM −.30** −.28**    —     
Creative Personality −.06 −.03 .15    —  
     
 
Study 4 
Nominal 
Fit 
Inherence 
Heuristic 
Counter-
factual 
Thinking 
Multi-
lingualism 
 
Nominal Fit    —     
Inherence Heuristic .34***    —    
Counterfactual Thinking −.25** −.17    
Multilingualism −.06 −.25** .04    —  
     
 
Study 5 
Nominal 
Fit 
Inherence–
Language 
Inherence–
Global 
CRT 
Chance 
Scale 
Nominal Fit —     
Inherence–Language .36***    —    
Inherence–Global .11 .25**    —   
CRT −.29*** −.28** −.13    —  
Chance Scale .14 −.01 −.01 −.07    — 
      
* p < .05.  ** p < .01.  *** p <.001. 
104 
 
Appendix B 
Table B1 
Means of the Measures in Studies 1–5 
      
Measure 
Study 1 
(children) 
Study 2 
(adults) 
Study 3 
(adults) 
Study 4 
(adults) 
Study 5 
(adults) 
      
Nominal Fit 
(possible range [children] = 0 to 
1) 
(possible range [adults] = 1 to 7) 
0.55 
(0.42) 
2.14 
(0.85) 
2.09 
(0.95) 
2.41 
(1.12) 
2.31 
(1.06) 
Inherence Heuristic 
(possible range [adults] = 1 to 9) 
0.00a 
(0.79) 
5.89 
(1.10) 
5.85 
(1.11) 
5.95 
(1.28) 
 —b 
Age 
(range = 4.18 to 7.96 years) 
5.89 
(1.15) 
— — — — 
Multilanguage Exposure 
(range = 0 to 2) 
0.19 
(0.43) 
— — — — 
Need for Closure 
(possible range = 1 to 9) 
— 
5.33 
(0.72) 
— — — 
Need for Cognition 
(possible range = 1 to 9) 
— 
5.79 
(1.25) 
— — — 
Raven’s SPM 
(possible range = 0 to 12) 
— — 
4.47 
(2.45) 
— — 
Creative Personality 
(possible range = −12 to 18) 
— — 
4.97 
(3.99) 
— — 
Counterfactual Thinking 
(possible range = 1 to 9) 
— — — 
5.33 
(2.28) 
— 
Multilingualism 
(range = 0 to 17) 
— — — 
2.07 
(2.70) 
— 
Inherence–Language 
(possible range = 0 to 100) 
— — — — 
45.47 
(24.95) 
Inherence–Global 
(possible range = 0 to 10) 
— — — — 
6.76 
(1.83) 
CRT 
(possible range = 0 to 3) 
— — — — 
1.66 
(1.13) 
Chance Scale 
(possible range = 0 to 30) 
— — — — 
13.15 
(5.97) 
a Children’s scores were standardized (hence the zero average). 
b Please see the Inherence–Language and Inherence–Global measures further down in the table. 
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Appendix C 
Sample scripts from the Coins chapter of the books used in Study 8 
This book is called “Why?” It talks about why some things are the way they are! Let’s talk about coins. You know 
how coins are round, right?  
 
Pro-Inherence book Anti-Inherence book 
Well you know, it seems right that coins are round. Look, 
they fit into candy machines just right. If they were a 
different shape, they wouldn’t fit in so well.  
Also, it works really well that coins are round, because 
then, when you reach into your pocket to get some 
coins, they won’t poke you. If coins were a different 
shape, they might be pointy and poke you.  
And, you know how there are faces on coins? Well, 
because faces are round, and we put faces on coins, it 
seems like a good reason to make coins round. It makes 
perfect sense that coins are round. .  
So, can you tell Feppy why coins are round? [if child does 
not answer:] Let’s think about it together. What did we 
just read about that we could tell Feppy? [if child still 
does not answer:] Well maybe we could tell Feppy that 
coins are round because then they fit into candy 
machines. 
Well you know, a long time ago in all sorts of places, like 
Spain, coins were not like coins are today. They were not 
round, they were all different shapes. Look here [points 
to page]. They used these as their money.  
Today we have round coins, but they don’t have to be 
that way. They are round today just because people 
decided [emphasized included in reading] that they 
wanted it to be that way. But as long as you can use 
them to buy things, it doesn’t matter what coins look 
like.  
In the future, people might decide to make coins square 
or triangle shaped, or maybe even star shaped. People 
get to decide.  
So, can you tell Feppy why coins are round? [if child does 
not answer:] Let’s think about it together. What did we 
just read about that we could tell Feppy? [if child still 
does not answer:] Well maybe we could tell Feppy that 
coins are round because it is what people decided. 
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Appendix D 
Sample scripts from the Introduction, Coins chapter, and Conclusion of the books used in Study 9 
This book is called “Why?” It talks about why some things are the way they are!  
So you know how we clap when someone does a good job? And you know how fire trucks are red, and coins are 
round? And you know how we drink orange juice at breakfast? Something like these are the way they are because… 
 
Pro-Inherence book Anti-Inherence book 
…they make perfect sense. Some things just go together. 
Maybe they go together because of the way the things 
look, or maybe they do together because of the way the 
things work. So, today, some things are the way they are 
because it makes perfect sense for them to be that way. 
They really work best that way. 
Let’s talk about coins. You know how coins are round, 
right?  
A long time ago people just used coins [emphasis 
included in reading] as their money. Lots of people kept 
the coins in their pockets or in small bags. When they 
reached into their pockets or bags to get them out, the 
round shape of the coin worked really well. 
The coins were round and so it was smooth in people’s 
hands. And the round shape made the coins really easy 
to hold.  
So, just like fire trucks are red because it makes perfect 
sense for it to be that way [the fire truck chapter would 
have come before this chapter in this example], that’s 
why coins are round, because it makes perfect sense for 
them to be that way. There is an important reason that 
they are that way.  
Can you tell Feppy why coins are round? What did we 
read about? [if child mentions anything from the chapter 
beyond coins being round:] Yeah! That’s right! [if the 
child does not mention something from the chapter 
beyond coins being round:] Maybe we can tell him it 
worked really well for them to be like that. 
[Conclusion] We talked about why some things are the 
way they are. Something are the way they are because it 
makes perfect sense for them to be that way. They just 
go together because of the way they things look¸ or 
because of the way the things work. So, clapping after 
people do a good job, fire trucks being red, coins being 
round, and drinking orange juice for breakfast are all just 
because it makes perfect sense for them to be that way. 
And [emphasis included in reading] probably lots of 
other things today are the way they are because it just 
makes perfect sense for them to be that way.  
…of people a long time ago. Many people many years 
ago just decided to make them that way, or maybe 
something happened that made them that way. So, 
today, some things are the way they are just because of 
people many years ago. And people could have easily 
made them another way. 
Let’s talk about coins. You know how coins are round, 
right?  
Well, a long time ago there were places that used coins 
that were all different shapes. Many years ago, lots of 
people from the place with round coins moved to all 
different places all over the world.  
After they moved, they got the people in their new town 
to use round coins instead. Then, slowly countries all 
over the world started to use round coins.  
So, just like fire trucks are red because of people a long 
time ago way [the fire truck chapter would have come 
before this chapter in this example], that’s why we have 
round coins, because people a long time ago just 
happened to make it that way. There is no important 
reason that it is that way.   
Can you tell Feppy why coins are round? What did we 
read about? [if child mentions anything from the chapter 
beyond coins being round:] Yeah! That’s right! [if the 
child does not mention something from the chapter 
beyond coins being round:] Maybe we can tell him 
people just happened to start copying other towns.  
[Conclusion] We talked about why some things are the 
way they are. Some things are the way they are because 
of people a long time ago, but people could have easily 
make them another way. People might have had an idea 
and decided for it to be that way, or something might 
have happened to make it that way. So, clapping after 
people do a good job, fire trucks being red, coins being 
round, and drinking orange juice for breakfast are all just 
because of people long ago. And [emphasis included in 
reading] probably lots of other things today are the way 
they are just because of people long ago. 
 
